Originally published on the CGS blog on October 29, 2015.
In a prior post in the International Affairs Forum, I tried to outline what Western and Eastern polities might want out of the ever-fractious Middle East, using the P5+1 deal with Iran as a focus point.
Basically, this would be peace, prosperity, citizen-centered governance, and openness to global economic and social systems. In other words, we have had enough of this area’s interminable squabbling. We need to aim for more constructive regional and global engagement.
But there is a deeper set of issues and needs. First, let us take water.
Several analyses suggest that the recent major drought in the area of Syria was a factor in Syria’s unraveling. Water shortages are of even broader scope in the area.
If the people of Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, and even Saudi Arabia are impoverished by water depletion, governance systems are likely to destabilize, refugees will multiply, and oil supplies will be prejudiced as a result of civic unrest and violence.
This would be a disappointing future for those in the area. But why should Americans, Europeans, and everyone else care? The temptation is to think or say that the Middle East was dry before we appeared on its scene, and that is not our responsibility.
Enter oil. The Persian Gulf area has roughly half the world’s oil reserves. These are the lowest cost reserves available. The Persian Gulf countries currently originate over ⅓ of global crude oil exports. At present, the Strait of Hormuz (near the opening of the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean) is a potential choke point for the flow of this oil.
If governments in the area become engaged in major hostilities or become dysfunctional from citizen unrest and conflict, liquid fuel prices around the globe would go up, perhaps dramatically; global economies would likely fail to grow as accustomed, financial markets would be roiled, international trade would likely suffer from global economic contraction, and general global hardship could abound.
Now enter sectarianism. The Islamic Sunni/Shia dichotomy is everyday news. One might say this is just history, not the future, and the adherents of each sect can now focus on better integration with the remainder of the world, fatten their bank balances, enjoy vacations abroad, and get on with the future. Unfortunately, not all of the clerical establishments in the area are on board. History has a lot of inertia, carrying into the future. The mixture of national, ethnic, and religious group consciousnesses present the overall picture of a continually waving red flag.
Lastly is sunshine. MENA has lots of it. Combined with low rainfall, this has made the Middle East hot, dry, and limited in population. But the total solar energy flux vastly exceeds the energy value of the oil and gas deposits there and will last for over a billion years. Solar technologies and energy storage systems present the possibility that this energy might economically be translated into water supplies (by desalination and piping water inland), electricity, and even chemical fuels. One can imagine, for example, industrial scale solar PV complexes providing a combination of electricity, desalinated water for local use, and fuels such as hydrogen for fuel cell usages.
If the Middle East effectively embraces such a future, this could provide more biological carrying capacity for the area, productive employment for its abundant youth, a geographically decentralized tax base for governing bodies, and the possibility (but not the guarantee) of more decentralized, more democratized, and less parasitized political structures. In this bargain, one also economizes on greenhouse gas emissions without lowering the prosperity potentials of the Middle East.
At present, the countries in this area lack the capacity to realize these economic possibilities within themselves. As for the technical and economic potentials, they must draw upon the more advanced industrial tools and skills of Europe, the United States, and the Far East.
This provides a powerful, mutually beneficial complementarity. In the short run, the MENA areas can provide petrochemicals and labor to the industrialized areas and markets for the products and skills of those areas. In the longer term, MENA would be a reasonably prosperous and stable part of a globally sustainable ecosystem.
When contemplating how the global system might encourage such a future, one finds that much of the commentary on the Syria situation and the Middle East in general reflects a not-quite post-colonial mindset. See for example Henry Kissinger’s recent piece in the Wall Street Journal. However cogently argued, the implicit assumption in this treatment of the issue is that the United States must set boundaries between factions and balance “great power” ambitions, arranging matters for its own national objectives.
That is to ask both too much and too little of the United States. Our generalized interest—and the interest which can get broadest international appeal—is primarily in stable societies open to international economic, cultural and social interchange, not in gerrymandering the Middle East to the primary benefit of the United States or, for example, of Russia.
Many might be inclined to say that the burden of arriving at mutual accommodations in coping with water limitations lies first on the citizens in the area and their governments. This also might be said more generally in regards to reconciling their various national and sectarian rivalries.
This is true. But Syria and ISIL require international interventions to address the crises and to avoid potentially worse outcomes. In doing so, the external powers must take great care to avoid maneuvering for advantage in MENA and sparking a wider cold or hot rivalry among themselves.
Thus the entire global population has some stake in brokering peace between the rival societies of the Middle East and in coping with pressing problems such as water supplies. It would seem wise, therefore, to use whatever set of United Nations, regional, and civil society concords feasible to bring about these goals.
As noted above, the West and East would have much to gain from recycling petrodollars into long term energy and water generation facilities in this arid area, as opposed to arms sales conducive to human misery in MENA and potentially dangerous wider confrontations.
Such an undertaking will not necessarily be easy or clearly understood at all times to all concerned. But former US President Bill Clinton reportedly said, in speaking about dealing with obstreperous and dangerous foreign entities in less than apocalyptic ways, words to the effect of “Well, you can’t just kill them all.”
This is particularly good counsel to the Shia, Sunni, Iranian, Turkish, Kurdish, Iraqi, and Arabian leaders and their citizens. The era in which eliminating or subjugating others through violence can be thought likely to solve any group’s perceived problems is past. There is no local hegemon in sight. Iran might become the “strongest” power in the area, but it could not gain or exploit that status by force of arms if the United States, Europe, and/or other international systems protect other polities in the area from overt conquest or nuclear blackmail. This, indeed, is a part of the reason for the Iran nuclear deal. (Duh.)
Thus, the polities of that area will need to find ways to coexist with each other and participate productively in a global civilization. Or they will massively sacrifice the lives and prospects of tens and hundreds of millions of people who should have rewarding existence.
Even so, the above discussion asserts, global polities and their citizens also have a stake in outcomes in the Middle East. Thus, the agents of global polities — state actors, private sector interests, and civil society all may be involved in trying to help find ways forward, involving water, oil, sunshine, and the subjugation, or sublimation, of sectarianism and belligerent nationalism.
United Nations organizations are particularly relevant (see, for example, UN-sponsored talks on the Yemen conflict). The United Nations has structural and political limitations. Often it is not sufficiently organized to play decisive roles in addressing these challenges. But the exigencies of the Middle East situation might serve as a sort of forced draft on the United Nations structure. In the extreme, the now quiescent ‘trusteeship council’ might conceivably be brought into play.
Whether by coalitions, coalitions of coalitions, and/or UN structures, the primary task is not merely to referee or handicap local rivalries to aid a few external actors. Some refereeing or peacebuilding will be entailed. But the primary objective should be the integration of the Middle Eastern polities into a global system which relies upon them for needed energy supplies, and can help supply them with the technologies and skills required for their long term peaceful sustenance.
