Originally published on the CGS blog on May 20, 2014.
In a previous blog post, I asked the question “Ukraine: A Federalist Future?” At the time, there had been proposals to link a referendum on the structure of the Ukrainian state with the planned 25 May election for President and Parliament. Even 25 May would have been a short time to discuss the structures of the state in a country with sharp tensions and in which different factions were not speaking to each other.
Unfortunately (in my view), factions in Eastern Ukraine decided to hold a referendum on Sunday 11 May in a hastily organized way, with little if any public debate on the consequences of the referendum and strong pressure to vote “yes” on the only option presented. The central government, the European Union and the US have all indicated that they considered the referendum and its results invalid − in fact, illegal.
President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation had suggested on the eve of the referendum that it be postponed or cancelled. However, after the referendum, the Russian government indicated that the referendum showed the “will of the people” and that Russia would abide by the results.
Thus, we can ask: what was the subject of the referendum? What are its immediate implications? What role should outside institutions play–Russia, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the US?
The referendum was organized in only part of eastern Ukraine, in what is newly proclaimed as the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. The question posed concerned “yes” or “no” on the Russian word samostoyatelnost, which can be translated as “self rule.” Since there had been no real public discussion, the term could mean − and did mean − different things to different people: everything from greater autonomy within the existing constitution of Ukraine but with a greater recognition of Russian language and culture, autonomy within a to-be-created new Ukrainian federation, an independent state along the lines of Abkhazia, formerly part of neighboring Georgia or a willingness to join the Russian Federation on the model of Crimea. People were discouraged from voting “no,” and few did.
Thus, the 25 May election to be held in the rest of Ukraine will only concern a vote for members of Parliament and President with no referendum on the structure of the country. It is yet to be seen if people in the two “People’s Republics” who wish to do so will be allowed to vote on 25 May and if voting facilities will be created. The socio-political atmosphere remains tense, and there are all sorts of armed groups or militias under unclear command moving around. The central Ukrainian Army has been trying to take back some of the “lost ground.” It is unclear if there will be a halt and a cease-fire in the run-up to the election.
One possible model for the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics are the states created earlier in the Republics at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union: Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistra in Moldova, Nagorno Karabagh still torn between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the ill-fated Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation. One reason that President Putin suggested not having a referendum in Ukraine may have been his fears that the pattern of holding an unauthorized referendum would spread. There are a good number of peoples in Russia who are unhappy with the current constitutional status of their area and could look to creating a referendum to express their wishes. “You know where things start but not where they end.”1
Ukraine faces real internal problems: political, economic, and social. There is a need for dialogue, trust-building, and reconciliation within the country − all stepping stones to stable internal peace. There is also a need for a de-escalation of international tensions in which the US government can play a role. There may also be possibilities for US non-governmental organizations and academic institutions to play a role in mediation and in facilitating discussion on federal forms of government.2 Switzerland chairs the OSCE for 2014, and the Swiss Foreign Minister Burkhalter has been to both Ukraine and Russia and has proposed some broad de-escalation measures that need to be encouraged and made more specific.
There are also longer-term issues and geo-strategic considerations, but the short period to the 25 May elections remains crucial, and we have to see if some steps for reconciliation can be taken.
Notes
1 For a useful and detailed history of the creation and current status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia see: George Hewitt Discordant Neighbours, A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian Conflicts (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2013, 389pp.).
2 The US Institute of Peace had some interesting round tables held in cooperation with the US Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff in 1996, basically concerning the conflict in Chechnya. It would be useful to see what they are doing on the Ukraine situation. The Chechen discussion was only among US specialists. Obviously, there needs to be facilitated discussions among Ukrainians. See Patricia Carley Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession ( Washington, DC:US Institute of Peace, 1996).
