Originally published on the CGS blog on May 29, 2014.
How effective are UN peacekeeping operations in preventing and stopping violence? What about in addressing the root causes of conflicts? How does one measure this effectiveness? Are there alternatives to the ways that UN and regional organizations currently carry out peacekeeping operations?
29 May is the date that the UN General Assembly has designated as the day to honor the efforts of UN Military peacekeepers. Honor is due. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the “Blue Helmets” in 1988 − a testimony to the respect and confidence placed in them.
However, we must also examine their effectiveness and question whether these military personnel should be complemented by other forms of peace-building.
There have been recent news stories of UN peace operations in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo that highlight the inability or unwillingness of UN troops to stop the systematic rape of local women. Rape has become standard practice in the area, on the part of both members of the armed insurgencies as well as by members of the regular Congolese Army. This is just one example of “failure” being a key word in evaluating UN forces.
One problem is that there are no permanent UN-trained and -motivated troops. There are only national units loaned by some national governments but paid for by all UN Member States. Each government trains its army in its own spirit and values, though there is still an original English ethos as many UN troops come from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Nigeria. Now China is starting to provide troops with a non-English tradition.
Moreover, there is no such thing as consistency and predictability in UN actions to preserve order. The world is too complex, and the UN Security Council resolutions are voted on the basis of national interest and political power considerations. UN “blue helmet” operations have grown both in numbers and in complexity. Even with the best planning, the situation in which one deploys troops will always be fluid, and the premises of the original plans may change.
To be successful, UN peacekeeping operations need to have clear objectives, but such objectives cannot be set by the force commanders themselves. Peacekeeping forces are temporary measures that should give time for political leaders to work out a political agreement. The conflicting parties need to have a sense of urgency about resolving the conflict. Without that sense of urgency, peacekeeping operations can become ongoing as they have in Cyprus and Lebanon.
UN forces are important, but they should represent only one element in a peacemaker’s tool kit. There must be concerted efforts by both diplomatic representatives and non-governmental organizations to resolve the conflicts where UN troops serve. Policemen, civilian political officers, human rights monitors, and refugee and humanitarian aid specialists all play important roles.
There have been a good number of suggestions put forth by governments and NGOs that there should be a permanent UN peace force that could respond quickly to emergency situations. Such a standing force has usually been refused by government as being too expensive (even if it only costs a fraction of what is currently spent on national armies).
An alternative proposal has been for the creation within national armies of special units designed and trained for UN service which could work smoothly with similar units from other countries. In light of the relatively small number of States which regularly provide forces for UN work, it should be possible to create such standby units augmented by persons trained for humanitarian action.
As we honor the “Blue Helmets,” we need to put more effort into preventing armed conflicts, improving techniques of mediation, and creating groups which cross the divides of class, religion, and ethnicity.
