Originally published on the CGS blog on July 24, 2015.
Let’s look at the field positions of the parties in Iran, the United States, and Israel who seem to want to kill the agreement worked out between Iran and the P5+1 coalition.
First, let me address those in the Republican Party and in Israel who have expressed objections to this deal. I suggest that the basic fact is that you have won—a considerable field position—and if you kill the deal, you will lose.
You can assume that your publicly expressed concerns figured into this negotiation. You demanded a tough deal. You got one, and the international community won in these negotiations because the P5+1 had a strong field position and used it. Iran needed its sanctions lifted, so they needed this deal more than we did. And we made them pay for it.
Yes, you did win. Let’s stop the denial. Many Republican and Israeli objectors seem to have a hard time admitting it, but this agreement is thorough enough to make very difficult any Iranian move toward military use of nuclear technologies for 15-25 years. Beyond the controls on specific sites and techniques of uranium enrichment, the deal provides for comprehensive control of the nuclear supply chain and for IAEA monitoring of Iran’s nuclear technology activities—using very sophisticated means now available—for the foreseeable future.
The degree of surveillance built into this arrangement makes it highly likely that any significant move toward nuclear proliferation will be detected. Such a move would also risk international opposition and the loss of the economic benefits Iran clearly wants. Given its recent economic hardships, why would we expect Iran to repeat the grueling experience that forced it into this negotiation in the first place?
Nothing in this world is guaranteed, but now you have a good field position vis-à-vis Iran and nuclear weaponization.
The rest of the world will not necessarily sign up for maintaining thorough sanctions indefinitely just because that’s what the US wants. Nor can we reasonably expect that our allies in this endeavor, or Iran, would support any US attempt to re-do this grueling negotiation at the unilateral behest of our Congress. Other nations have invested a lot of time and attention in this deal. We would be playing a spoiler role. Our representatives would lose leadership capacity in a variety of ways. Iran would, of course, be outraged and feel it is entitled to “go nuclear.”
What was a contained problem breaks entirely out of the box. You would have lost leverage and peaceful options, which you probably could not regain. If all this ends up in another expensive and unpopular war in the Middle East, you know who would be blamed—within the United States, you. Outside the United States, the United States.
Now let’s look at the situation of the objectors in Iran. If those who fear and distrust “the West” somehow were to veto this opening to the greater prosperity and participation which the world has now on offer, they would be setting themselves up for massive disappointment and distrust from their own population.
Over time, this could be a lever for some form of “regime change,” which many in the west have longed for but have not been able to obtain.
Thus, Iran’s hardliners are also in a box. Iran agreed to this negotiation. It is getting sanctions relief out of it. The Iranian objectors could spin their rejection with all the wit and fervor at their disposal. But the Iranian people would know what they could have had and lost. They would know who lost it. They would not forget, and very well might not forgive.
The Iranians know this. They appear prepared to set their parliamentary vote on the agreement to a point after our congress votes. If we turn down the deal, they and their hard liners do not have to take any responsibility one way or the other. They can say they did the very best they could for peace, and the Great Satan screwed it up. The failure of the deal is entirely on our shoulders.
If the Iranians can figure out whom they want to be the villain in this piece, can’t you?
So what do I suggest for the objectors in the United States and Israel? Make all the noise you want about what you see as potential perils ahead, but turn that energy toward assuring the deal is implemented well—and, if you feel you must, hope the objectors in Iran turn it down.
If Iran takes the deal, you have gained much. If Iran is so foolish as to turn it down, here’s what will happen:
- The sanctions will stay in place.
- We will not see any additional limitation on Iran.
- War will remain an option—though an expensive, unpredictable and dangerous one in the area of the largest oil pool in the world.
- Iran will, at least for now, continue to be economically and politically hobbled by its own reactionary leadership.
We don’t know when the next reform wave might come. World oil markets will not have the benefit of Iran’s full potential oil supply, and you will continue to have a bitter enemy in their regime.
If this is the situation you want, here you will have it. But this way the onus would be on Iran.
So these are my suggestions. Posture if you want. But take these wins and avoid these losses.
