Originally published on the CGS blog on January 5, 2016.
As a major oil producer, the government of Saudi Arabia might know the dangers of pouring oil on a fire. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran related to the respective armed conflicts in Yemen and in Syria-Iraq and Kurdistan were already high.
U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby stressed the obvious when he said that Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr’s execution “risks exacerbating sectarian tensions at a time when they urgently need to be reduced.” The Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for “divine vengeance” upon the Saudis.
A mob, rarely formed spontaneously in Tehran, did not wait for the divine to punish, but rather attacked the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and set fire to an annex. Saudi Arabia has broken off diplomatic relations as a result. Crowds also demonstrated in Bahrain.
The Saudi government began the year by beheading 46 other people accused of undermining the State. Most were Sunnis and said to be related to a branch of Al-Qaeda and to have used or advocated using violence to further their aims. Nimr had been highly critical of the Saudi government but had not called for violence.
There are some of us, such as members of the Association of World Citizens, who are against the death penalty even when there are fair trials, competent defense lawyers, and appeals. There were none of these practices in the case of al-Nimr or of the others. He was killed to send a graphic message that “encouraging, leading, and participating in demonstrations” will not be tolerated.
The Shia Sheikh al-Nimr was known to the Saudi authorities as a domestic dissident. He had studied Islamic doctrine abroad and so was critical of the lifeless authoritarian orthodoxy of Islam in Saudi Arabia. He came from the eastern province of Saudi Arabia where the majority of the Shia live, some two million of Saudi Arabia’s 18 million people. The Shia believe themselves marginalized, and in terms of education, health services, and employment, they are marginalized. With the spirit of the Arab Spring, the young Shia in the eastern provinces hoped for change, and al-Nimr became their spokesman.
When a marginalized population begins to protest and ask for more inclusive policies and practices, a government has basically two choices. The more intelligent one is to listen to the demands—see what the issues are, which issues can be negotiated—and try to reach a compromise. One that will not radically change the socio-economic and political structures, but will meet enough of the demands to make for a more inclusive society, thus limiting the impact of the protests.
The other choice is to strike so brutally and with enough publicity that no other demands will be made and the dissidents will go away. Since governments have armed security forces at their command and usually control the court system, they often use the second approach.
A recent example is Syria and the Assad regime. The first non-violent protests in March 2011, largely limited to Dara in south Syria, were for a more inclusive society and demanded relatively moderate reforms. These demands were not met by negotiations in good faith, but by repression, arrests, and torture with enough publicity thought to serve as a warning to others.
After a few months of non-violent protests, it became obvious to many that the government would not negotiate changes. Armed violence seemed to be the only alternative. Thus we find Syria further mired in armed conflict with no negotiations on a more inclusive society in view.
Syria, alas, is not the only case of highly visible repression of political demands rather than discussion and negotiations. Although Saudi Arabia is critical of the Syrian government, they are following the same repressive policy. The regional situation getting worse is a real possibility.
It is not clear what we on the outside can do to foster more intelligent policies in Saudi Arabia—a country largely closed in on itself with a small decision-making elite, a large amount of money from oil (even if oil prices are declining), and a large supply of arms largely from the US and Western Europe.
Those of us active in the human rights field have often expressed our concern to the Saudi government about human rights violations, most recently concerning the fate of the Nimr’s nephew. Ali al-Nimr was arrested as a minor for participating in demonstrations and is now condemned to death by crucifixion.
The Saudi diplomats do not even go through the pretext of listening to NGO representatives. The Saudi government is trying to create an enlarged Islamic community of States to support its policies, especially by going beyond the League of Arab States to include African States with significant Muslim populations. I would therefore not expect many international voices to be raised beyond those of Iran and Iraq, though I would like to be proven wrong.
While I do not believe in “divine vengeance,” the beheadings on the first day of the year mark an important step down the wrong path. There are likely to be negative consequences, and we must watch the situation closely.
