Originally published on the CGS blog on June 1, 2015.
As Winston Churchill once quipped, “God so loved the world that he did not send a committee.”
The Drafting Committee of the Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was unable to draft an outcome document. Even with last-minute efforts of the Conference President and the UN Disarmament Secretariat to smooth over all controversial wording in the document, there was no consensus. In the end, the US, the UK, and Canada refused to accept the final document citing the proposal of a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East.
Since there has been no visible progress on reducing nuclear weapons through negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States–the US and Russia hold some 95% of weapons–efforts have been made to make legally-binding nuclear-free zones.
The first nuclear-free zone to be negotiated was a direct aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. A nuclear exchange between the US and the USSR was close enough that Latin American leaders were moved to action. Mexico immediately began to call for a de-nuclearization of Latin America. In February 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed. It established a permanent and effective system of control containing several pioneering elements, as well as a body to supervise the Treaty.
The Latin American Nuclear-weapon Free Zone was followed by four other geographic zones: the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia– basically States that have neither the financial or technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons.
Today, there are four tension areas involving nuclear States where no negotiations are going on: Korea, India-Pakistan, the wider Middle East, and US-Russia. Only Korea and the Middle East were mentioned by name in the draft final statement. However, when the draft speaks of “nuclear-weapon States,” they have the US and Russia in mind.
The Conference notes with concern that, despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral nuclear arms reductions, the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles of nuclear-weapon States still amounts to several thousands and many remain on high alert. The Conference stresses in this regard that the reductions in deployment and in operational status are welcome but cannot substitute for the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons as required under Article VI of the Treaty.
There have been earlier calls for a Middle East nuclear-free zone. The NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 called for negotiation on such a zone. The desirability of establishing one is widely recognized; indeed, the UN General Assembly has had several resolutions calling for one, first introduced by Egypt and Iran in 1974. Since 1980, such resolutions have attracted consensus support, including the qualified endorsement of Israel, which has supported the concept but argued that it cannot proceed until peace settlements are achieved with its Arab and Islamic neighbors.
There is also the possible linkage between nuclear and chemical weapons, involving the perception that nuclear options may be needed as security against chemical attacks.
Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has called for negotiations on such a zone, saying,
This is the last chance to build security in the Middle East based on trust and cooperation and not on the possession of nuclear weapons.
At the 2015 NPT Review, it was the delegation of Egypt led by Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hashim Badr that most actively pushed for the UN Secretary-General to call for a conference in 2016 to discuss a Middle East nuclear-weapon free zone–whether Israel wants to attend the conference or not. He also called for the replacement of Ambassador Joakko Laajava of Finland for being ineffectual. Finland has been charged by the UN to organize such a conference and has been willing to host it, but no visible progress has been made.
There were some, myself included, who felt that the recent nuclear agreement with Iran would create an atmosphere that would allow for progress. However, I underestimated the difficulties that would arise over the Middle East.
A major difficulty of moving to good-faith negotiations on a Middle East nuclear-free zone is the absence of a regional organization involving all States in the wider region. There needs to be leadership from within the Middle East for constructive, institution-building action. I believe that there is an urgent need to take steps toward creating a broad security and cooperation zone that has conflict resolution, arms control, human rights, and economic cooperation dimensions.
The prime example of such a multi-purpose regional security organization is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The creation of such an organization arose from proposals and discussions in the late 1960s as an effort to find ways for structured discussions between NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral countries of Europe. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was a small number of NGOs first calling for a pan-European agreement.
Formal talks among government representatives started in Helsinki during the first half of 1973 and then were carried on from September 1973 to June 1975 in Geneva. However, prior to 1973 and during the Geneva stage of the negotiations, there had been a number of informal discussions which included NGOs and academics.
Today, there still may be such great suspicion of the motives of States in the Middle East that NGOs must again take the lead. Helping to build an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East is a challenge to all of us of good will–a creative challenge we must undertake together.
Another major difficulty in reaching a consensus is that there is no real UN forum to discuss disarmament and arms control. In the early Reviews, compromises were reached because the most active disarmament ambassadors were willing to accept weak “final statements,” knowing that they could fight again another day in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Today, the Conference on Disarmament is so soundly asleep that what arms control discussions are carried out in the UN are done at the UN General Assembly. However, the General Assembly was not designed for continued and technical discussions on arms issues. The NPT draft statement was polite yet noted that,
The Conference expresses its concern that since the 2010 Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament has not commenced substantive work on any agenda item in the context of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.
I tend to be pessimistic concerning the will of governments to deal with disarmament and arms control issues. I see no national leaders, and when States regularly met at the UN or in treaty reviews such as the NPT Review, there is constant repetition but little forward motion. Unlike human rights and socio-economic development–where NGOs can work at the local level while trying to influence national and world policy at the UN–military strategy, arms production, deployment of military forces are in the hands of national executives (with some small influence from legislatures).
The area where NGOs might have an impact, as I mentioned, is to focus on the creation of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East. Perhaps efforts to reduce unreasonable reactions from Ukraine and NATO also would be useful. Strong and diverse NGO leadership is needed–leadership whose voice can be heard above the beating drums and saber rattling.
