U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping
From Aspiration to Implementation

Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping
U.S. Engagement in International Peacekeeping:

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A Project of the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping

With support from The Compton Foundation

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Acknowledgments

The project that gave rise to this Report was a collaboration among many talented and hard-working people who generously gave of their time and imagination. This is an opportunity to give them much-deserved thanks.

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Thanks to the members of the Steering Committee who joined Don Kraus and me in guiding this project: Ron Capps, Bill Durch, and Jordie Hannum.

The principal chapters of this Report were authored by Jonathan Benton, Kristen Cordell, Jordie Hannum, Ryan Kehmna, and Paul Williams. Thanks to them for accepting the challenge of writing thorough, accurate, and cogent pieces covering a broad topic under tight constraints on time and length. In addition they cheerfully participated in expert roundtables where drafts of their papers were subjected to comment and critique. This Report could not have been completed without their expertise, knowledge, skill, and professionalism.

This Report includes a Participants List (see page 80) that sets forth the names of some of the people who contributed to this project in a variety of ways. Those who led the discussions at the four expert roundtables deserve special recognition: Ariela Blätter, Don Kraus, Bridget Moix, Bill Nash, Jolynn Shoemaker, Mark Sweberg, and Mark Vlasic.
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Don Kraus is the inspiration for the “aspiration” and “implementation” in the subtitle of this Report. He has the capacity to see both what is needed and how to achieve it in promoting a forward-looking international policy for the United States. Amanda Bowen has been the locomotive that has pulled this project over hill and dale to get it to its destination on schedule. Her creative and tireless efforts, combining her organizational skills and her attention to detail, have made this project enjoyable and this Report possible.

We are proud to present this Report and trust that it will be useful in aiding the United States in taking a greater role in international peacekeeping.

Robert A. Enholm
Washington, D.C.
October, 2011
Introduction

Robert A. Enholm
Citizens for Global Solutions
Education Fund
The purpose of this Report is to make the case that the United States should embrace international peacekeeping as a valuable and effective foreign policy tool. In addition, this Report identifies and recommends specific steps that the United States should take to support and expand its role in international peacekeeping.

It is trite, but true, that we live in an increasingly interconnected world. Cooperation is required to create and maintain safety and security for all. Conflict and instability anywhere in the world can imperil our nation and the globe. International peacekeeping missions are effective in restoring calm in zones of war and hostility, allowing societies to rebuild, communities to mend, and economies to flourish once again.

President Obama came into office signaling that his Administration would expand the role of the United States in international peacekeeping. Under his leadership the United States paid the arrears of U.N. peacekeeping assessments that had accumulated. In a speech in September 2009, President Obama set forth recommendations for strengthening U.N. peacekeeping missions, including increasing U.S. commitment, saying, "We are willing to consider contributing more U.S. civilian police, civilian personnel, and military staff officers to U.N. missions."

U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice echoed these statements a few months later in a speech to the U.N.’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, “[I]f we are going to assign peacekeeping missions with challenging mandates, we must equip them with the capabilities required to implement them effectively. We need to develop a strategy, together with the Secretariat, for addressing the chronic shortages of enabling capabilities, including transport, helicopter, engineering, and medical units.”

The Administration’s aspirations regarding peacekeeping have not been realized. Thus, the subtitle of this Report is “From Aspiration to Implementation.” Progress requires more than simply being “for” peacekeeping. The challenge of this project is to bring together experts in the field, to gather and discuss their ideas, and to build a consensus on practical next steps for the Administration and Congress to implement United States engagement in international peacekeeping.

International peacekeeping is coordinated international action taken to support an established peace process. Peacekeeping is generally undertaken by the United Nations under its authority to maintain


international peace and security. (Peacekeeping is sometimes undertaken by other international organizations, such as NATO or the African Union.) Missions conducted by the U.N.’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) must be approved by the U.N. Security Council, where the United States is a Permanent Member. Since its founding in 1945, the U.N. has undertaken 69 peacekeeping missions, and 15 remain active (see Table of Current U.N. Peacekeeping Missions on page 9 of this Report).

Over the past few years peacekeeping has evolved, from a simple model in which “blue helmets” were positioned to keep two antagonistic sides apart, to a more complex model in which peacekeepers engage in a range of activities from military operations to policing activities to humanitarian relief. Peacekeepers today disarm former combatants, rebuild judicial systems, and monitor elections. Lessons learned from past peacekeeping operations are applied to succeeding missions.

The United States supports international peacekeeping because it is the right thing to do and because peacekeeping is effective and serves the interests of the United States. The effectiveness of peacekeeping is evidenced in the growing demand for peacekeepers. Since 1999, the number of U.N. peacekeepers has grown from 12,000 to over 120,000. International peacekeeping serves fundamental national interests of the United States in maintaining peace and promoting the establishment of stable nations around the globe. International peacekeeping missions have succeeded repeatedly in tamping down violence and providing the space in which disputants can resolve their differences politically. In the absence of peacekeeping, hostilities may simmer and flare up. Nations may devolve into failed states, creating problems that the United States cannot ignore. Failed states are associated with illegal drug and weapons trade, human trafficking, and contraband nuclear materials. They increase risks of famine, piracy, and pandemic. Failed states increase the danger of armed conflict within one country spilling into other countries, and their failures create migrations of internally displaced persons and trans-border refugees and attendant international instability and humanitarian risks.

In order to focus this Report, we identified four key areas in peacekeeping to examine: (1) U.S. funding for U.N. peacekeeping, (2) Women in international peacekeeping, (3) Training and equipping peacekeepers, and (4) Standing civilian and police capacity.

For each focus area, the project engaged writers to prepare an initial discussion paper that was the subject of an expert roundtable for half a day. With the benefit of the input from the roundtables, the writers completed the chapters and recommendations that form the basis of this Report.

In Chapter 1, Jordie Hannum and Ryan Kehmna assert that the United States should pay its U.N. peacekeeping assessments in full and on
time both because U.N. peacekeeping operations are a cost-effective force multiplier for the United States and because U.N. peacekeeping operations bring significant benefits to the United States. They offer specific recommendations for action by the United States.

In Chapter 2, Kristin Cordell examines the importance of achieving greater gender balance in peacekeeping operations and recommends steps that the United States can take to increase the number of women in peacekeeping and in leadership roles in peacekeeping operations.

In Chapter 3, Paul Williams looks in detail at the issues surrounding the training and equipping of peacekeepers and sees several specific initiatives that the United States can undertake to support and improve peacekeeping from this perspective.

In Chapter 4, Jonathan Benton addresses the justification for standing civilian and police capacity in peacekeeping and makes several recommendations of actions that the United States can take to improve this component of international peacekeeping.

In addition, this Report includes detailed exploration of the history of U.S. funding of U.N. peacekeeping, the protection of women and girls in peacekeeping, and the success of peacekeeping in Liberia, where after years of civil war peacekeeping helped to create a stable, forward-looking nation with many obvious benefits, including increased trade with the United States.

With this Report we are pleased (1) to present a list of detailed and practical recommendations of actions that the United States can and should take to support international peacekeeping and (2) to create a consensus around and momentum behind those recommendations. We look forward to promoting the policy ideas presented and discussed in this Report and to educating the people of the United States and their leaders on the wisdom of robust United States support for international peacekeeping.
### Current U.N. Peacekeeping Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troop Level</th>
<th>U.S. Share of Assessed Budget(^1)</th>
<th>Year of Commencement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>16,475,282</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>India and Pakistan</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4,382,024</td>
<td>1949</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>15,796,632</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N. Disengagement Observer Force</td>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>13,712,783</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,349</td>
<td>148,040,720</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
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<td>U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>17,157,718</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12,189,876</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>10,443</td>
<td>132,097,545</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>12,252</td>
<td>215,360,540</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>22,596</td>
<td>458,477,513</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei</td>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) July 1, 2011-June 30, 2012. The U.S. assessment rate for this period is approximately 27.14%.
Chapter 1

U.S. Funding for United Nations Peacekeeping

Jordie Hannum and Ryan Kehmna
Better World Campaign
Introduction

Peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations are a boon to United States national security and foreign policy objectives and, despite their increasing costs in recent years, represent an extremely cost-effective force multiplier for the United States in hotspots around the world. In light of the significant benefits the U.S. derives from U.N. peacekeeping, and the new and evolving challenges currently facing these crucial missions, it is more important than ever that our nation fully meet its peacekeeping dues payments and not accumulate arrears.

For all of these reasons, the United States should reaffirm its commitment to pay its contributions that support U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Historical Background on U.S. Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping

While the United Nations Charter does not explicitly provide for the creation of peacekeeping operations, U.N. “blue helmets” have come to define and symbolize the U.N.’s work throughout the world over the last six decades. Since the beginning of U.N. peacekeeping in the late 1940s, peacekeeping missions have grown substantially in size, cost, and complexity.

In 1978, the U.N. had 16,700 uniformed personnel deployed on six separate missions around the world at a cost of just over $200 million. By 2008, circumstances had changed dramatically. During the Administrations of Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the U.N. Security Council – with the urging and support of the United States – backed a significant expansion of U.N. peacekeeping, tripling the number of missions and greatly increasing the budget. These Republican and Democratic Administrations supported this growth as they recognized the important role U.N. peacekeeping plays in promoting stability, and during this time, there were successful operations in Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. Currently, more than 120,000 uniformed and civilian personnel are deployed to 15 peacekeeping missions on four continents, at an annual cost of $7 billion.¹

In addition to rising mission-related costs and shifting personnel needs, the nature and purpose of U.N. peacekeeping has changed markedly since those first post-World War II missions. Gone are the days when small numbers of unarmed soldiers would be dispatched solely for the purpose of observing ceasefire situations with the consent of all interested parties. Instead, U.N. peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex and hazardous, with peacekeepers deployed to some of the world’s most

volatile conflict zones to support the implementation of peace agreements, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, facilitate humanitarian assistance, train police, and monitor elections.

While there has been bipartisan support for peacekeeping, the United States Congress has often been reluctant to fully fund the missions that the United States has voted to authorize at the Security Council. In the early 1990s, some in Congress expressed concern about both the growing costs associated with peacekeeping missions and the assessment rate for U.S. peacekeeping dues, and as a result, instituted a 25% legislative cap on peacekeeping contributions. In addition, during the 2000s, the Bush Administration and Congress serially underfunded peacekeeping, resulting in over a billion dollar shortfall, which amounted to 20% of the U.N.’s total peacekeeping budget for 2008. (See Recent History of U.S. Funding to the U.N. on page 66.)

More recently, the first years of the Obama Administration saw the U.S. renew its financial commitment to U.N. peacekeeping. The FY 2009 supplemental appropriations bill included language providing back dues to missions and raising the peacekeeping cap to 27.1% for Calendar Years 2005-2009, allowing the U.S. to pay $721 million in arrears accrued during that period. In addition, Congress provided full funding for the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets during FY 2010-11. These recent developments demonstrate that failing to pay our dues ultimately does not result in any cost savings. Rather, funding shortfalls simply delay necessary resources and force Congress to appropriate larger sums at a later date.

Past and Current Justifications Advanced for Underfunding Peacekeeping

In spite of the fact that underfunding our nation’s financial commitments to U.N. peacekeeping does nothing but kick the proverbial can down the road, the appetite of some in Congress to do just that has only increased in recent months. The passage of FY 2012 appropriations legislation this July by the House State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee would shortchange Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), the account that funds U.S. assessed obligations to U.N. peacekeeping, by more than $450 million. In addition, the introduction of House legislation in August calling for a moratorium on new or expanded peacekeeping missions shows that peacekeeping operations and the funding of them remain a lightning rod for some legislators. Among the key arguments articulated for denying full funding to U.N. peacekeeping

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3 The FY 2012 State Department and Foreign Operations funding bills currently moving through the House of Representatives include significant cuts to CIPA and the U.N. regular budget. As a result, it remains unclear whether the U.S. will accrue new arrears in its peacekeeping or regular budget assessments during the coming year.
activities is that their operations are inefficient and ineffective in resolving conflict, a waste of scarce U.S. dollars, and not commensurate with the benefits accrued by the U.S. for its support.

How The U.S. Benefits From Peacekeeping

The Effectiveness of U.N. Peacekeeping Activities

U.N. peacekeeping, while not a panacea, has proven to be an extremely effective means of reducing violence and preventing its resurgence. The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping in ending conflict and instability was highlighted in a RAND Corporation study comparing the success rates of eight U.S.-led nation-building missions and eight U.N.-led peacekeeping operations. The study, which compared the missions based on the criteria of whether the countries they served were peaceful or not, found that of the eight U.S.-led cases, only four had achieved peace. Conversely, seven of the eight U.N.-led peacekeeping missions were determined to be at peace. In addition to this success rate, the study also identified the U.N.'s decision-making apparatus, unified command and control structure, and high-level of international legitimacy as major advantages of U.N. peacekeeping operations over missions conducted by other international organizations, such as NATO, the European Union, or the African Union.

The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping in preventing the resurgence of conflict was also documented in a 2004 study which found that, in the post-Cold War era, deploying U.N. peacekeepers reduces the hazard that a country will slide back into all-out war by 50%. In addition to decreasing the likelihood of a resurgence of conflict, peacekeeping has also been shown to bolster GDP growth in conflict-affected areas. Indeed, one recent study found that in the first three years after a conflict, U.N. peacekeeping missions have a substantial effect on GDP, with annual growth rates nearly 2.4% higher in post-conflict countries where peacekeeping missions are present.

Besides demonstrating the sheer effectiveness of peacekeeping itself, these benefits also speak to the longer-term cost-effectiveness of U.S. financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions. By decreasing
the likelihood of further conflict, and spurring economic growth in the first several years after the end of a conflict, the presence of these missions reduces the likelihood that additional U.S. resources will be necessary, either for military or humanitarian purposes over the long-run. This point was corroborated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, who said that, “[United Nations] peacekeepers help promote stability and help reduce the risks that major U.S. military interventions may be required to restore stability in a country or region. Therefore, the success of these operations is very much in our national interest.”8 (See Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia on page 26 of this Report.)

Advancing U.S. Interests: U.N. Peacekeeping as a Force-Multiplier

The effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping in preventing the resurgence of conflict and reducing the size of future potential investments by the U.S. also points to another major benefit of peacekeeping activities: they serve as a crucial force-multiplier for the United States. This is because peacekeeping missions advance key foreign policy and national security interests, while simultaneously requiring little from the U.S. in terms of personnel and spreading the financial burden among all U.N. Member States.

Simply put, as large, influential, and resource-rich as it is, the United States cannot take on the responsibility of safeguarding international security alone. Each day, U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel do just that, working to stabilize conflict zones and prevent the collapse of fragile states around the world by supporting the implementation of peace agreements, demobilizing combatants, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and creating conditions for political reconciliation and free and fair elections. As evidenced by our nation’s strong and consistent support over the years for the creation of new peacekeeping missions and the expansion of many already in existence, these missions are carried out in places that, while critically important to U.S. foreign policy or national security goals, are unlikely to see U.S. boots on the ground. Consequently, U.N. peacekeeping represents an extremely effective tool for U.S. policymakers, helping to pacify volatile regions and deny potential safe havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals, at a relatively low cost to the United States.

The U.N.’s ongoing efforts in Sudan and South Sudan are good examples of the force-multiplier principle at work. The U.S. has long been invested in the peace process between the Khartoum-based government of the Republic of Sudan and the now independent South Sudan. Republican and Democratic Administrations helped broker and staunchly supported

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implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the long-running civil war between north and south and laid the groundwork for South Sudan’s independence on July 9, 2011. To help stabilize the region and to underscore the priority the U.S. gives to these efforts, the Obama and George W. Bush Administrations have both appointed Special Envoys to Sudan.

However, the U.S. has done more than simply operate in a bilateral capacity on issues related to peace and security in these restive countries. As successive Administrations have identified U.S. engagement on Sudan as an important foreign policy priority, they have simultaneously pushed strongly for a multilateral response, with the current Administration using its influence at the Security Council to advocate for three separate U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region. The U.S. has not only voted to authorize, but also played a pivotal role in crafting the mandates of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the U.N. Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA), and the U.N.-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As part of these missions, thousands of U.N. military, police, and civilian personnel are currently on the ground working to ensure that the Republic of South Sudan is secure, governable, and economically viable; that aligned forces in the disputed oil-rich region of Abyei; and that civilians in Darfur are protected from violence and former combatants are demobilized and reintegrated into society.

The importance of these missions in bringing security and stability was underscored by a recent study which showed that a return to war in Sudan could cost more than $100 billion over a decade and that current donor nations “would likely find themselves paying out in extra peacekeeping costs and humanitarian assistance,” up to $30 billion dollars.9

Peacekeeping’s Cost-Savings for U.S. Taxpayers

Currently, the United States peacekeeping assessment rate for U.N. operations is 27%, a rate negotiated every three years by the U.S. and other Member States with the U.N.10 While the United States pays the highest amount of any nation, given the myriad benefits that the U.S. receives from peacekeeping, and the fact that other countries pay almost three quarters of the costs of missions the U.S. authorizes, U.N. peacekeeping is not just a strategically wise investment for the U.S., but a financially

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10 Although the U.N.’s peacekeeping budget is separate from the regular budget, it is also financed by assessments to member states. The U.N.’s peacekeeping assessment formula mirrors the regular budget rate structure but gives greater discounts to poorer nations. The resulting funding deficit is compensated for by the five permanent members of the Security Council: the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, all of whom have veto rights.
prudent one as well.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to the benefits of peacekeeping operations for the United States, U.S. financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions have been shown to deliver significant cost savings to American taxpayers when compared with the prospect of unilateral U.S. military action. According to a 2006 study completed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.N. peacekeeping is eight times less expensive than funding a comparable U.S. force.\textsuperscript{12} The essential cost-effectiveness of U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping has been acknowledged by recent Administrations. For example, in testimony before the House Science, State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriations Subcommittee in March 2005, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked that “[U.N. peacekeeping] is much more cost effective than using American forces. And of course, America doesn’t have the forces to do all of these peacekeeping missions, but somebody has to do them.” Moreover, in 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) gave U.S. funding for U.N. peacekeeping through the CIPA Account a rating of “Very Effective,” judging CIPA funds as achieving their stated goals and being linked to the State Department’s objectives.

Of course, as some in Congress rightly note, U.N. peacekeeping operations must be improved to address inefficiencies and the changing nature of the missions. To that end, the U.N. has made significant strides in recent years to reform and streamline its approach. Over the past decade, the U.N. has undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen peacekeeping operations, including in 2007, when the Secretary-General improved the support side of field missions by removing logistical, administrative, and technical functions from the U.N.’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and placed them in the Department of Field Support (DFS). Perhaps most significantly, the U.N. has begun implementing the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), a five-year project that the U.S. has championed, to transform the delivery of support to U.N. peacekeeping and political missions by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of services. Aimed at quickening the start-up of missions, improving the provision of physical support to field missions, and increasing accountability and transparency, the GFSS is expected to deliver significant cost savings and increased efficiency as it is fully implemented. Already in its first year, the GFSS has saved hundreds of millions, including nearly $50 million in the cost of aircraft leases and fuel, $63 million by decreasing the aircraft fleet and establishing regional flight schedules, and $21 million by extending the useful lives of certain vehicles and equipment.

\textsuperscript{11} Assessments are primarily based on gross national product (GNP), of which the United States has one of the largest, which is why it pays the highest amount.

The cost savings yielded by this initiative and the overall cost savings stemming from U.S. investments in U.N. peacekeeping operations are even more relevant in the context of today’s difficult budgetary climate. With the Department of Defense, among other U.S. government agencies, being asked to shoulder a greater share of the fiscal burden by cutting expenditures and, in the near future, potentially drawing back some of its own forces, it is critical that the U.S. continue paying its fair share of the U.N.’s peacekeeping budget so that the U.S. and its international partners can effectively respond to global crises that threaten our interests. As discussed above, such investments are beneficial and ultimately save the U.S. money because they allow our nation to advance vital international policy objectives, such as supporting stability and democratic transitions in key volatile regions -- Haiti being a perfect example -- without the level of financial sacrifice required by unilateral intervention.  

Given the ongoing interest of U.S. policymakers in countries like Sudan, Liberia, and Haiti, U.N. peacekeeping operations will likely take on even greater importance as the U.S. military is forced to cut back. At the current moment, U.N. operations in fragile states are advancing goals that successive U.S. Administrations and Members of Congress from both parties have identified as worthwhile, if not vital to U.S. foreign policy and national security. Moreover, as the aforementioned analyses demonstrate, U.N. peacekeeping missions are performing these critical duties while simultaneously saving the U.S. substantial sums of money. Consequently, far from paying too much to keep U.N. blue helmets in the field, it is clear that the United States cannot afford to leave its financial commitments to U.N. peacekeeping unfulfilled.

Reimbursement to Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs)

In order for U.N. peacekeeping to continue to function as an effective tool for stabilizing volatile conflict zones and alleviating serious humanitarian crises, as well as promote U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, the United States must pay its peacekeeping assessment on time and in full. Moreover, keeping the U.S. current on its financial obligations to peacekeeping is also an issue of fairness. Few are more acutely aware of that reality than the countries that provide uniformed personnel to support U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Despite its central role in authorizing and funding peacekeeping operations, the U.S. provides only a small contingent of uniformed personnel to support them. As of July 31, 2011, only 100 of the nearly 100,000 military and

13 In light of Haiti’s territorial proximity to the United States, the U.S. government has long been concerned about political instability and humanitarian crises in Haiti, and has dispatched the U.S. military to Haiti on several occasions over the last two decades, most recently in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake. In spite of the significant casualties sustained by MINUSTAH during that disaster, U.N. blue helmets have played a crucial role in ensuring security and facilitating humanitarian assistance throughout the country over the last two years.
police personnel serving on U.N. peacekeeping missions were from the United States. This disparity between U.S. involvement in the creation and financing of these missions and the number of troops it puts on the ground is not unique to the U.S., nor has it always been the case. At the beginning of the 1990s, seven of the top ten troop contributing countries (TCCs) to U.N. peacekeeping operations were members of the “Western European and Others” regional group (WEOG) at the U.N., and nearly 71% of all uniformed peacekeepers came from these countries. However since then, for a variety of reasons, including a desire to source peacekeeping personnel from non-WEOG nations, U.N. peacekeeping missions have witnessed a decline in the number of troops and police coming from industrialized countries, with WEOG members currently contributing only 8% of all U.N. peacekeepers worldwide.

Over this period, the need for peacekeeping personnel has increasingly been filled by uniformed personnel from developing or emerging countries, with more than 85% of all U.N. peacekeepers currently coming from members of the Group of 77. This shift in troop contributors has encouraged a perception that only a few nations bear the burden of implementing increasingly complex peacekeeping mandates.

The past two decades have witnessed not only an expansion of the sheer number of peacekeeping missions throughout the world, but also an increase in the complexity of their mandates and the dangers inherent to their missions. As Walter Dorn, a Professor at the Royal Canadian Military College who has served with a number of U.N. peacekeeping missions, observes, “Peacekeeping is no longer about the blue berets sitting between two sides, but rather a much more complex, multidimensional challenge that involves the U.N. in counterinsurgency, policing, intelligence gathering and nation building....” For example, at one point the U.N. mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had 41 separate tasks delineated in its mandate.

Moreover, since 1999 the protection of civilians “under imminent threat of violence” has been a key feature of most U.N. peacekeeping mandates, but the ability of small numbers of peacekeepers to protect

17 David Haeri and Rebecca Jovin, “Why we need the West in U.N. Peacekeeping,” p. 2.
large civilian populations is finite.\textsuperscript{19} U.N. peacekeepers are tasked with achieving these objectives in what are often highly challenging and hostile operating environments, including vast expanses of land in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan that lack paved roads and other basic infrastructure.\textsuperscript{20} They are also often dangerous. According to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), more than 900 peacekeepers have been killed since 2004.\textsuperscript{21}

The increasingly complex and challenging nature of these missions and their operating environments has placed a premium on modern military equipment, including helicopters, night-vision equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles,\textsuperscript{22} as well as top-line training for participating military contingents. However, many TCCs lack the financial capacity necessary to purchase such equipment, and require assistance sustaining the types of complex and multifaceted operations increasingly sought by the U.S. and other members of the Security Council.

Due to the budgetary constraints on many TCCs and to encourage countries to offer personnel, the U.N. reimburses countries that contribute uniformed personnel, equipment, and support services to peacekeeping operations. The current compensation rate paid to U.N. Member States for troop contributions is $1,028 per soldier per month. (For a rough comparison, it is estimated that it costs as much as $500,000 per year to send a single U.S. soldier to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{23}) The U.N. also reimburses countries for contributions of major equipment, self-sustainment, and medical support services through its Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) system.\textsuperscript{24} These reimbursement rates, which are approved by the General Assembly, play an important role in helping TCCs, particularly lower and middle income countries, sustain their participation in these operations.

When the U.S. or other U.N. Member States fail to provide adequate funding to cover their peacekeeping assessments, these reimbursement payments are often among the first expenses to go unpaid.\textsuperscript{25} Since the U.N. is prohibited from borrowing externally to fill funding shortfalls,
peacekeeping missions rely on Member State contributions to cover their costs. Thus, the practical effect of the U.S.’s failure to pay its dues in full is that the U.N. is forced to place the financial onus for underfunded peacekeeping missions on the TCCs themselves. For example, in June 2007, U.S. allies India, Pakistan, Brazil and Bangladesh were owed nearly $200 million in unpaid reimbursements due to U.S. peacekeeping debts.

This not only puts the U.S. in an awkward position politically, it also provides a potent disincentive for TCCs to continue putting their own men and women in harm’s way to support U.N. peacekeeping activities. When the U.S. votes for missions that it subsequently fails to fund, it sends a negative message to countries that are willing to provide the manpower and equipment necessary to make such operations possible, especially developing countries, who may find it more difficult to shoulder such financial burdens alone. In light of the increasingly challenging nature of present day peacekeeping operations, it is critical that it be financially practical for TCCs to participate in these missions.

While it is important that the U.S. and other industrialized nations continue to facilitate the work of TCCs by paying their peacekeeping dues, full funding is not the whole story. On July 1, 2011, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon the Secretary-General to establish an advisory committee this fall to consider a possible increase in the troop reimbursement rate. This action is significant, because the $1,028 per soldier monthly reimbursement rate has not been increased since 2002.

During a debate in May on the issue in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, responsible for handling U.N. budgetary and administrative matters, a number of top TCCs spoke out in favor of raising the troop reimbursement rate, with Argentina’s Ambassador to the U.N., Jorge Argüello, arguing that the lack of an increase in these payments is placing a

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29 By comparison, COE (contingent-owned equipment) reimbursement rates are reviewed every three years by the UNGA’s COE Working Group, with the last such review occurring in late January 2011. While the 2011 COE Working Group did recommend an increase in reimbursement rates of 1.3% for major equipment and 2.1% for self-sustainment services, many top TCCs made similar complaints about these rates as they did during the debate on troop cost reimbursements. Specifically, Sebastián di Luca, Third Secretary of Argentina’s U.N. Mission, said that, while the Working Group had an opportunity to address “the gap between mission mandates and the available capabilities to implement them,” the rate increases it recommended were not sufficient to “sustain today’s complex missions.” He went on to state, “What is at stake here is the viability of our continued participation in the peacekeeping operations.” Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gaab3992.doc.htm. Efforts by the General Assembly to review the troop reimbursement rate in 2009 were frustrated by an impasse on procedures for the review.
financial burden on many TCCs and threatening their ongoing participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities. Several other envoys echoed these sentiments, noting that inflation and the increased costs of training and equipping soldiers had eroded the purchasing power of these payments.  

Certain key TCCs have also taken steps to demonstrate their frustration over the funding issue by removing resources from missions. In April of this year, Uruguay, the tenth largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations overall and a major provider of military personnel and police to MINUSTAH, pulled a fixed-wing airplane out of Haiti and threatened to remove 1,300 military personnel from the U.N. mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). According to media reports, these actions were in large measure due to disputes over funding for peacekeeping operations with wealthier financial donor countries. In addition, India’s decision to remove its Mi-35 attack helicopters from the Democratic Republic of Congo, while not solely based on the troop cost reimbursement issue, was influenced by it. This action is particularly detrimental to MONUSCO since the mission relied on them to deliver humanitarian aid and protect civilians from violence.

The importance of having forces with the appropriate capacity levels in such difficult operating environments was underscored this spring in Abyei, the disputed oil rich region on the border between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan. When the Sudanese army first invaded the region in late May, peacekeepers from Zambia were reported to have remained hunkered down in their barracks for 48 hours during the worst of the fighting. UNMIS confirmed that the peacekeepers’ base was under fire at the time, and the U.N. had to dispatch, at additional cost to the U.S. and other Member States, a company of Indian peacekeepers to bolster the Zambian forces. While there are issues here surrounding the willingness of peacekeepers and their governments to engage, it is also true that under-equipped and under-trained peacekeepers can conclude that they are overmatched by local forces.

This incident highlighted the importance of having forces with the advanced military hardware and training necessary to work effectively in such difficult situations and to better protect civilians. It also served as a reminder that many TCCs, because of funding constraints, do not have the capacity to supply such materials on their own. As Bruce Jones, director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, said of the situation in Abyei, “Large-scale heavy infantry frankly don’t do much to reinforce

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32 Lynch, “India’s withdrawal.”
the political process unless they have mobility that can deliver military punch." 33 Without these types of forces or countries that can provide them, peacekeeping missions have greater difficulty in executing their mandates, which may result in the need for additional resources in the short term when crises erupt and reduce the likelihood for overall mission success in the long term.

Given the complexity and risks inherent to peacekeeping missions that currently operate in exceptionally difficult environments and the need to better protect civilians, it is critical that these missions have access to more advanced military technologies and a reliable supply of well-trained military and police personnel. In order to continue attracting TCCs to these difficult missions, particularly forces that are well-trained and well-equipped, the U.S. must continue to fully fund its peacekeeping assessments and the issue of reimbursements to TCCs must be addressed.

At the same time, given the current economic climate and the tough budgetary choices being made by many governments, any decision to raise the troop cost reimbursement rate must be based on solid, timely data from TCCs. Indeed, during the May debate in the Fifth Committee, some U.N. Member States expressed concerns that there was not a strong enough evidence-based argument being made to justify an increase in reimbursement rates. 34 Consequently, while the need for increased reimbursement rates to TCCs is very real, any decision to change these payments should be based on complete data and a transparent accounting of how each TCC puts these reimbursements to use.


34 U.N. General Assembly, Do More with Less.
In light of the negative impacts of U.S. failures to fulfill its financial obligations to the United Nations, as well as the broader need for timely, adequate, and effective funding for U.N. peacekeeping, we recommend that Congress and the Administration undertake the following actions with regards to peacekeeping funding:

1.1 Each new Fiscal Year, Congress appropriates enough money for the United States to fully pay its current peacekeeping assessments.

While the premise of this recommendation is relatively straightforward, nothing is more important towards ensuring that the U.S. lives up to its financial obligations to U.N. peacekeeping activities. As a permanent, veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States must agree before any peacekeeping mission can be authorized or expanded. Over the past two decades in particular, the U.S., under both Republican and Democratic presidents, has not only consented to, but has actively sought the expansion of U.N. peacekeeping activities in conflict zones around the world. Consequently, Congress should fund the State Department’s Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account at levels that fully fund the U.S.’s assessed peacekeeping dues for a given year.

1.2 Congress permanently repeals the 25% cap on U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The U.S. renegotiates its assessment rates with the U.N. every three years, and while the U.S. has been successful over the last two decades in renegotiating its peacekeeping assessment level from a high of 31.7% to the 27% rate we paid in 2010, the 25% cap on U.S. assessments enacted 17 years ago remains in place. While Congress frequently waives the cap, the issue must still be revisited every year, sending a poor signal to countries who put their troops on the line to serve on missions the United States authorizes and often demands. Moreover, the cap contributed to a ballooning in U.S. arrears during the 1990s and 2000s, which meant many of our allies were not reimbursed. Instead of enacting ad hoc waivers for the cap, Congress should allow the U.S. to fully fund its commitments to peacekeeping and abolish the cap once and for all.

1.3 The United States uses its voice and vote at the U.N. to increase reimbursement rates for TCCs and index these payments to inflation.

In addition to paying its peacekeeping dues in full, the United States should use its unique position as a permanent member

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Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping Issues for Congress."
of the Security Council and the U.N.’s largest contributor to advocate for the first increase in troop cost reimbursement rates for TCCs in nearly two decades.\textsuperscript{36} Since the troop cost rates have not undergone formal consideration in nearly twenty years, addressing these payments will necessitate serious engagement by the United States this October when the advisory committee convenes to consider a possible increase.

Due to inflation and the rising costs associated with training and maintaining peacekeeping forces, an increase in these payments is critical for the continued participation of many countries in U.N. peacekeeping operations and could potentially attract new contributors with more advanced military technology. Given the complexity of most new missions and need for newer technology, attracting new TCCs will take on added importance. Moreover, the U.S. should advocate that these reimbursement rates be pegged to inflation so they do not fall behind again.\textsuperscript{37} In light of the fact that decisions regarding reimbursement rates are generally adopted in the General Assembly on a consensus basis, the U.S. maintaining a commitment to pushing the issue (it has been generally supportive of a modest increase over the past year) could potentially make a significant difference.\textsuperscript{38}

At the same time, future decisions to raise reimbursement rates need to be made based on accurate and timely data supplied by the TCCs themselves in order to ensure that such increases are evidence-based and adequately take account of their needs. Consequently, in return for U.S. support of efforts to increase troop cost reimbursement payments, we also recommend that the U.S. use its voice and vote at the U.N. to convince TCCs to submit to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) a report on how these reimbursement funds are utilized. Provided the troop cost reimbursement rates are increased, we also recommend that the U.S. use its voice and vote to convince TCCs to submit an additional report on this issue each year thereafter.

\textsuperscript{36} While TCCs have also expressed serious concerns regarding the impact of current Contingent-Owned Equipment reimbursement rates on the financial viability of their continued participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions, and the U.S. should use its voice and vote to ensure adequate reimbursement rates for equipment and support services, these rates are reviewed by UNGA every three years.

\textsuperscript{37} In an international context, dealing with multiple currencies, “inflation” is a more complex concept than in a domestic context, but there are a variety of ways of creating an inflation index in international finance.

\textsuperscript{38} MOU and Claims Management Section Official, U.N. Department of Field Services, interview with author, August 10, 2011 and information relating to U.S. support for increase in reimbursement stems from September 7, 2011 expert roundtable discussion on this Report.
1.4 The United States uses its voice and vote at the U.N. to push forward on peacekeeping reforms particularly related to the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS).

Given the number of peacekeeping missions and the size of the peacekeeping budget, it is critical that implementation of the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) continues. As the largest contributor, the United States has a vital role to play in ensuring that the efficiencies are maintained and that the progress made in the first year continues throughout the five-year project. As the implementation phase progresses, there will be a focus on further reducing ground and air transportation costs, enhancing support to deep field and short deployments, and strategic communications. These enhanced and faster support capabilities will be particularly important as they facilitate faster achievement of the missions mandates, which reduces the overall cost of operations.39

U.N. operations in Liberia over the past two decades serve as a potent example of the benefits of U.N. peacekeeping and why it serves American national and economic interests.

In 1989, rebel leader Charles Taylor initiated a civil war after invading Liberia from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire. The first eight years of the war claimed more than 150,000 lives and displaced close to one million people. A 1993 peace agreement backed by the U.N. led to the creation of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help implement the peace agreement. At its height, UNOMIL included just over 360 military personnel and 220 civilian personnel and cost $103.7 million over five years. After many delayed elections, Taylor was brought to power in 1997. Having completed its mandate to support the election process, the Security Council authorized UNOMIL to withdraw.40

Shortly thereafter, however, civil war resumed due to ongoing issues of political exclusion, lack of national reconciliation, an unprepared security sector, and continued regional instability.41 By 2003, rebel groups controlled roughly two-thirds of the country and the international community increased pressure for Taylor to resign. In fact, Secretary of State Colin Powell, stated that the United States had an interest in stabilizing West Africa and that it was obligated to “not look away” from such crises.42 In August 2003, the conflict ended with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana. Overall, the 14 years of conflict killed an estimated 250,000 people, displaced one-third of the country’s population, and left the country in physical, institutional, and economic ruin.43

In September 2003, the Security Council authorized the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to stabilize and secure the country with a much more robust force and mandate than had existed for the

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UNOMIL mission. Security Council Resolution 1509 authorized 15,000 military personnel, over 1,100 police, and a substantial civilian component, making it the U.N.’s largest peacekeeping mission at the time.\textsuperscript{44}

In 2005, the country held free and fair elections, resulting in the selection of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the first democratically elected female president in Africa. Since her inauguration, her Administration has tackled government corruption, strengthened national institutions, and reformed the national security forces with U.N. and U.S. assistance. As Liberia prepares for general and presidential elections in 2011, UNMIL continues to work closely with the National Elections Commission, as well as the Liberia National Police, to ensure that the gains secured by the U.N.’s presence over the last several years remain in place. The cost to the United States for supporting this operation in FY 2011 was approximately $155 million.\textsuperscript{45}

While this cost is significant, the stability created by U.S. support for U.N. operations in Liberia has also created benefits for U.S. commercial interests in the region, in addition to U.S. foreign policy interests. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2003 - after a decade of volatility and the year U.N. peacekeepers were first authorized to operate in Liberia - total U.S. exports to the country amounted to $33 million, and there existed a substantial trade deficit. Beginning from that year, however, bilateral trade increased markedly, with U.S. exports rising to over $191.4 million in 2010, a nearly 101% increase over the previous year’s totals alone and now more than the U.S. pays annually for the peacekeeping operation. In addition, since 2003, the U.S. has steadily moved from having a trade deficit with Liberia to a trade surplus.\textsuperscript{46}


\textsuperscript{45} Given final FY11 figures for United States contributions within the CIPA account were not available by publication, this figure comes from a conversation with staff from the Office of Peacekeeping, Sanctions & Counter-terrorism in the State Department’s International Organizations Affairs Bureau.

The pivotal role played by U.N. blue helmets in helping Liberia end its long-running civil war and transition to democracy is testament to the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as an important example of how these operations promote U.S. national and economic interests in a highly cost-effective manner. Moreover, the case of Liberia also shows that pulling peacekeepers out of conflict zones too early or failing to provide them with adequate resources can imperil peace and security and necessitate greater expenditures in the future.
Chapter 2

Women in International Peacekeeping

Kristen A. Cordell
Refugees International
Introduction

One of the goals of this Report is to examine the role of women in peacekeeping and to suggest ways in which the United States should advance improvements in this area.

Over many years the roles of women in war and conflict -- and in peace and security -- has received increasing attention. In 2000, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) calling for recognition of differing gender perspectives on security, seeking greater protection for the human rights of women and girls in wars and conflicts, and opening greater participation by women in preventing conflict and creating and preserving peace. Nevertheless, even by 2010 the recruitment of women peacekeepers was found to be “one of the greatest challenges facing the United Nations.”

In addition, today greater attention is directed toward efforts to eradicate sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and the use of SGBV as a weapon of war, as opposed to accepting SGBV as an unavoidable side effect. In 2008, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 (and later UNSCR 1888), requiring peacekeepers to protect women and girls from SGBV in armed conflicts. An important and tangentially-related topic is sexual abuse and exploitation (SEA) by peacekeepers. (See Preventing Violence Against Women in Peacekeeping Operations on page 44 of this Report.)

By most measures, women are disproportionately underrepresented as peacekeepers and in the leadership of peacekeeping operations. (See table on page 43.) It is widely acknowledged that peacekeeping efforts would be enhanced with greater involvement of women. Why should greater involvement of women in peacekeeping operations be sought? What are the impediments to achieving this goal? And what can the United States do to help?

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2 UNSCR 1325 states: “Reaffirming also the resolve expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls, including by ending impunity and by ensuring the protection of civilians, in particular women and girls, during and after armed conflicts, in accordance with the obligations States have undertaken under international humanitarian law and international human rights law.”

3 Within DPKO “peacekeepers” can refer to staff playing a variety of roles described generally as (1) Military personnel (including a formed battalion or seconded experts ), (2) Police personnel (including Formed Police Units (FPUs) or seconded individuals), and (3) Civilian staff.
Mandate

The goal of increasing the proportion of female staff and achieving gender balance within the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has existed for more than a decade. UNSCR 1325 called for an expansion of women’s contributions to field-based operations across peacekeeping missions “especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel.” This reflected the U.N. Security Council’s recognition of the unique experiences of women, men, girls, and boys in wartime and the desire that the U.N.’s staff should reflect and draw upon those experiences.

In 2006, DPKO’s internal policy directive *Gender Equality in UN Peacekeeping Operations* looked more carefully at the gaps in recruitment and retention of women which resulted in an internal mandate to “advance gender balance among DPKO headquarters and mission staff, including at senior management levels.”6 In 2009, still far from the “gender balance” it originally mandated for its missions, the U.N. Security Council passed UNSCR 1888, employing stronger language about the responsibility of Member States to deploy qualified women military personnel and for the first time suggesting that women join missions as military and police personnel.7

The Value of Enhanced Roles for Women as Peacekeepers

In addition to serving the goal of gender balance, increasing the number of women in peacekeeping operations has been shown to have positive operational impact.

Security is measured by the ability of a population to be mobile, to have access to resources and infrastructure, and to be free from physical violence. The primary task of peacekeepers is to contribute to that security. Data from a 2010 DPKO-sponsored study on women peacekeepers based at the U.N. Mission to Liberia (UNMIL) shows empirical evidence that mainstreaming women in peacekeeping roles can have an impact on security for the population.8 In addition to the well-known and recognizable all-women Indian Formed Police Unit (FPU), women in UNMIL held a variety of roles in the mission, such as senior level leadership (including

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7 U.N. Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1888* (2009) “Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training to carry out their responsibilities.”

the then only female Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG), individual police (from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), all-women military battalions (from Ghana and Nigeria), and individual military experts (from the Philippines).9

The first finding is an improved capacity for collection and analysis of community-based intelligence among female military and police staff. Understanding the host community has been recognized as a core component of keeping the peace, especially useful in areas of protracted conflict that divide communities along ethnic lines. Within UNMIL, an all-women battalion of Ghanaian women established a relationship that improved intelligence gathering by connecting informally with local women who were initially reticent to report crimes or suspicious activities.10 In one case, open dialogue between peacekeepers and local women resulted in the uncovering of a significant stockpile of weaponry.

How might gender affect intelligence collection? UNMIL’s male peacekeepers viewed their goals narrowly, citing their impact on crime rates for armed robbery and assault, with little attention to the provision of wider human security. Women peacekeepers, by contrast, described their goals to include the protection of civilians and saw community intelligence as broad and all encompassing. None of the all-male units had developed community outreach, rehabilitation activities or response efforts for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the communities, while the women peacekeepers had done so.

An increased capacity of missions to address SGBV is the second area where women peacekeepers have a significant impact. In August 2009, the United Nations highlighted the connection between a greater number of women in a mission and a lower rate of SGBV in the community.11 The data showed two impacts: improved prevention through security and improved response to women survivors. To prevent SGBV in the community in and around Monrovia, the Indian FPU introduced night patrols and self-defense classes for teenage girls. Their presence, alongside focused activities, effectively eroded intimidation and provided reassurance for vulnerable groups,12 creating a more hospitable environment for civilian women.

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9 Women represent 168 of the 10,165 peacekeepers within UNMIL.

10 The 10th contingent of Ghana Battalion, headquartered in the port city of Buchanan, in Grand Bass County, Liberia, is the largest female military battalion in the UNMIL. Buchanan is a small and predominately Muslim community, a context in which local women’s interaction with male soldiers was forbidden. The battalion’s 41 women serve in supportive roles, including medical and administrative assignments.


Data from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia show that local women characterized their interaction with male peacekeepers as difficult, and as a result, expressed themselves in oblique language. In the case of rape or sexual violence, this makes response difficult and contributes to perpetrator impunity. This is an area where data shows that women peacekeepers have a comparative advantage.

The all-women Indian FPU also set up Women and Child Protection Units (WCPUs), highly accessible and secure police stations across the country, staffed with female police. By working alongside local women, female peacekeepers serve as resource for building the capacity of the community to sustain national security structures and also emphasize transparency and inclusivity for those structures. This is important in post-conflict settings, where the population often does not trust the institutions tasked with keeping them safe. In Liberia in 2008, only 12% of women victims reported incidents of sexual abuse to the police.

The presence of women peacekeepers “inspires more women to join their local police services,” which strengthens the systems as well. Women peacekeepers in Liberia lead recruitment of women for the National Police (which now boasts almost 20% women). As national police and military institutions evolve to include more women, they can gain credibility. Higher gender integration of institutions correlates with enhanced transparency and decreased rates of corruption. The presence of women in evolving security structures enhances overall national stability in the transition to peace.

Women peacekeepers become role models for local women in challenging social and cultural context, both within and outside of the security sector. Having female and male peacekeepers working side-by-side can be catalytic in breaking down traditional views that discriminate and marginalize women. After four sequential rotations of the all-women FPU, there is significant erosion of long-standing harmful practices that have inhibited women (specifically rampant child marriage, polygamy and prostitution).

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14 Ibid.
15 United Nations Mission to Liberia, Legal and Judicial System Division, Research on Prevalence and Attitudes to Rape in Liberia (September to October, 2008).
16 U.N. Department of Public Information “United Nations in Global Effort to Increase Number of Female Police in Peacekeeping Operations Women Officers Have Special Role to Play in Societies Affected by Conflict ‘Power to Empower’ Theme of Campaign to Move United Nations towards Gender Equity” (U.N. Press Release PKO/218 WOM/1751, August 2009).
19 Mayanja, “Strategies for Enhancing Gender Balance.”
Young women, formerly highly susceptible to these practices, are now more likely to consider a range of educational and work opportunities. How does this impact the security of the population? Evidence shows that empowered women (1) are far less likely to become impoverished or dependent, (2) have healthier children, (3) are more likely to invest their incomes in family goods, and (4) are more likely to receive education. As a composite, gender-balanced nation states are less internationally aggressive and have higher growth rates overall. Empowering women appears to be a means of contributing to long-term stability.

**Impediments to Women in Peacekeeping**

The issues surrounding women in peacekeeping are part of a larger debate over the recruitment of quality staff to the U.N. amid the challenges of constant staff shortages, rotation procedures, health and welfare issues, and security concerns. As a coalition of Member States, the U.N. is dependent upon troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs) to staff its forces. This means that the number of women in peacekeeping operations is dependent upon the number of women among the total contributed personnel. The low number of women in peacekeeping missions reflects the low number of women in the military and police forces across TCCs and PCCs (including the United States).

The U.N. has recognized the impact on women peacekeepers on increasing security on the ground in host countries and placed a priority on increasing the ratio. It is truly the responsibility of all Member States to assist the U.N. in building its quality and number of personnel (both through personnel and financial resources). The U.S. military is particularly poised to do so, given the breadth and range of talent it holds. Ann-Marie Orler, Deputy U.N. Police Advisor stated, “Much more can be done if we have more female officers. However, we depend on Member States to nominate these [female] formations. The U.N., therefore, strongly encourages police-contributing countries to establish a policy that sets the percentage of the contribution of female police officers at par with the national gender

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21 Mary Caprioli, “Gender Equality and State Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality on State First Use of Force,” International Interactions 29 (2003), p. 195-214. Links between gender equality and state aggression is an interesting debate, too lengthy for the purpose of this paper, but for more information, also see “Women and Nation Building” (Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 2008).


ratio.”

Through improved research, policy doctrine, and coordination efforts, the U.S. government can support and sustain this effort.

The Department of State, in its first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review Report, committed itself to “boost the number of women police officers and peacekeepers who are particularly well suited to work with host country female populations and local communities,” but it is not clear how this aspiration is to be achieved.

Improving clarity on the structure that the U.S. has for bringing qualified women candidates to the U.N., the challenges at both the national and international level, and the evidence of the comparative advantage of women’s inclusion will yield recommendations on new strategies for the United States.

A 2011 report Improvement of the Status of Women in the U.N. System focused specifically on addressing the recruitment and retention of female civilians (including at higher levels) throughout DPKO. It found the percentage of women in professional civilian posts to be 39.9%, with very few women represented in senior management.

The study also found women rarely advanced within the system and are concentrated at headquarters (as oppose to field missions). There are currently three women among the 17 Special Representatives to the Secretary-General (SRSG) and no women serving in DPKO as force commanders.

Civilian women also have much higher rates of turnover than their male counterparts.

In 2011, despite the prevailing mandates and requirements, the implementation of the recruitment and retention of women within DPKO is highly irregular, dichotomized and under reported. Few women sign up, and those who do rarely stick around. Ninety percent of DPKO missions are non-family duty stations. Female personnel regularly cite spousal and family considerations as reasons for turning down assignments. Women also opt out based on self evaluation. A study by Women in International Security found that potential women peacekeepers are regularly “reluctant

27 Women are now in the majority at the P3 level – 56% of P3 and 25% of non-seconded P4 staff. The proportion of women to men continues to drop until the D2 level, where of the 7 non-seconded staff, 4 are men and 3 are women.
29 The mission’s highest civilian post.
31 U.N. General Assembly, Improvement of the Status of Women.
33 Ibid.
Another possible explanation was uncovered by Abraham Afrim-Narh’s
assessment of Ghanaian women serving DPKO. He found a significant
disconnect between the perception of women peacekeepers (as
favorable) and their “actual involvement,” which she found to be extremely
limited. A 2006 report from DPKO found that women in mission were
regularly “assigned to administrative and non-challenging positions
that deprive them of opportunities for both professional satisfaction and
career development.” Considering the constraints, a lack of meaningful
involvement is a likely deterrent to securing quality talent. Female staff
cannot be seen only as those responsible for community clean up days,
health fairs, and outreach at orphanages.

The constraints on the inclusion of women and their operational impact with
the U.N. deserve greater attention, specifically through the lenses of troop-
contributing countries (TCCs) and police-contributing countries (PCCs). The
U.S. government’s institutional obstacles to recruitment of women
determine its overall contribution. As of July 2011, the United States has
100 total staff (75 as police and 25 as military) serving in U.N. missions
around the world. The greatest concentration is in Haiti (MINUSTAH),
where eight of the 68 police personnel deployed are women.

The U.S. military does not recruit many people, let alone women, to DPKO.
This is grounded in the fact that U.S. military personnel are stretched thin
in other operational theatres and U.S. military leadership is wary of a
command structure that could undermine its own. Additionally, the forces
are drawing from a base of only 13-14% women staff. On the policing
side, the State Department’s International Office of Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) relies on a subcontractor system for filling individual
staff police requests. The partnership is challenging as contractors set
their own recruitment terms, which are not gender sensitive. So this is
not particularly a gender issue, it is a recruitment issue; broader still, it is
a values issue.

34 Ibid.
Armed Forces,” (Master’s Thesis, University of Oslo, 2006); http://www.duo.uio.no/publ/statsvitens-
kap/2006/41510/41510.pdf.
36 U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Strategies for Enhancing Gender
37 The Security Council commits to include a gender component in U.N. field operations (1325, OP5),
and requests that the Secretary-General’s reports to include information on the progress of gender
mainstreaming within each operation (1325, OP17).
38 Micah Zenko, “The Case for U.N. Peacekeeping,” (Washington, DC, Council on Foreign Relations,
2011).
2.1 The U.N. continues to set targets, calling on Member States to contribute to DPKO women peacekeepers with specific, tangible skills, replicating programs such as the Secretary-General’s Global Initiative.\(^{40}\)

This creates a “pull” for more women in the ranks of peacekeepers, and we know this can have an impact. In 2008, MINUSTAH took concerted action to increase a gender balance and achieved great gains. Their civilian representation increased for international staff (from 32% to 34%), U.N. volunteers (from 26% to 28%), and national staff (from 12% to 18%).\(^{41}\) However, the real responsibility relies on Member States (including the United States), to provide the “push” for the qualified female staff to peacekeeping missions.

The U.S. military has its own set of institutional obstacles to U.N. staffing and recruitment.\(^{42}\) The U.S. does not assign many people, let alone women, to DPKO. This is grounded in the fact that U.S. military personnel are stretched thin in other operational theatres and U.S. military leadership is wary of a command structure that could undermine its own. So this is not particularly a gender issue, it is a recruitment issue; broader still, it is a values issue.

2.2 DOD conducts an internal evaluation of its personnel for their increased deployment of women to multilateral operations.

The research must explore women’s operational impact, barriers and opportunities and link relevant skills sets to U.N. Terms of References (across PKO departments). In South Africa, a vigorous military review in 2006 revealed many women were interested and prepared to serve in DPKO, which led to new policy on the inclusion of women. Today, that country boasts one of the highest ratios of women to men in the U.N.\(^{43}\) Argentina and Chile both used national reviews on defense policy and gender as precursors for design of the participation element of their National Action Plans.\(^{44}\)

The review should carefully consider trends in women’s participation in the U.S. military, how domestic military skills sets would translate

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\(^{42}\) Zenko, “The Case for U.N. Peacekeeping.”

\(^{43}\) Mayanja, “Review of Strategies for Enhancing Gender Balance.”

internationally, and how women’s experiences while working for the U.S. would impact their international work. This might include creatively thinking about where to find women military staff, using examples from within the government. In its recruitment of women police for peacekeeping missions, the State Department realized a core challenge was the lack of national policing units to serve as FPUs. Instead of being deterred, they created a partnership with the New York Fire Department to serve in Haiti (MINUSTAH).45 The idea was forward-leaning, and created a new resource for recruitment efforts.

2.3 DOD includes preferences for women within job descriptions for staff officers. Recruitment for U.N. positions from within DOD is gender blind. Currently there are no explicit regulations on including women in staff requests. DOD has asserted that language encouraging women candidates to apply for U.N. postings would constitute gender-based discrimination.46 This position seems overly cautious and should be reexamined. Encouraging women to serve as staff officers is not discriminatory; it is a type of targeted recruitment similar to encouraging women to enlist.

Other nations have been successful at addressing the concern of discriminatory action because they identify the tangible skills and value-added that women can bring to certain roles (such as providing assistance to victims of SGBV). Secondly, they structure recruitment to mirror the U.N. system preferences, such as sending full battalions instead of staff spread out among posts. Their delegation of staff is in line and in response to the preferences of the U.N.47 In coordination, the State Department must continue to move away from use of contactors to supply police - or alternatively work with contractors on their resistance to include gender within position descriptions.

2.4 DOD creates incentives for U.S. women to serve the U.N. While the challenges are many, the incentives for U.N. service are few. Serving the U.N. is perceived as a career-ending move for many in the U.S. military. In order to serve in DPKO, U.S. military staff must take off time from their other pursuits (such as education, professional development, and deployment), significantly diminishing opportunities for promotion. Participation in missions must be valued, which can only come through attaching the experience to positive implications for career development.

45 United States State Department Official, author interview, August 2010.
46 Department of Defense Staff Member, author interview, 2010.
47 Mayanja, “Strategies for Enhancing Gender Balance.”
Once the actual policy has been promulgated, creative information, and awareness campaigns should provide outreach to women candidates highlighting the work of women who have served in the U.N., demystifying the process and encouraging mentorship. The State Department’s Office of International Narcotics and Law (INL) is leading the way on this effort by sharing information at law schools, police centers, and training academies. They participate in conferences and bilateral partnerships to inform policy makers on the topic. Recently they provided funding for international participants to attend the “International Association of Women Police Conference,” an internal event in Lexington, Kentucky. This work should be continued and emulated by partners such as DOD.

Given its leadership within the U.N. and its focus on improving the professionalization of its own staff, the U.S. should contribute only professional staff with professional skill sets. Sending low-ranking military staff to DPKO will only undermine the effort of the U.N. to do away with tokenism. As a result, DOD must expand beyond sending only staff officers to DPKO.

2.5 **DOD continues to support, participate in and fund roster programs and training to build the pool of qualified women personnel.**

In the longer term, the United States can take a number of steps to expand the capacity of the applicant pool. Rosters collect and vet quality talent for quick mission placement based on need. They have proven a successful way for attracting and placing quality female candidates — especially at more senior levels.\(^{48}\) This is useful because having women involved at the decision making level of peace and stability operations has proved key to increasing women throughout the ranks.\(^{49}\) USAID has considered having gender experts in their Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Roster, and should look to the Norwegian Refugee Council’s GenCAP Roster as one possible good example.

2.6 **The United States engages military academies, graduate and leadership programs and training institutions to broaden the pool of female talent (including West Point, the National Defense University, and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operational Institute).**

Gender staffing and gender staff capacity are not one and the same. These institutions are forward-leaning in their preparation of tomorrow's military leaders and must be tasked with broadening the pool of female talent. Additionally, they are crucial resources for increasing the knowledge of gender across staff, ensuring that men

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\(^{49}\) *Ibid.*
are partners and advocates on issues such as eliminating SGBV.

2.7 Partnering with other PCCs and TCCs to aid information and knowledge sharing.
A potential best practice is for the State Department to work on increasing the applicant pool, providing new training opportunities for women and often reaching out to female police abroad through the iPost Project. The office has also supported DPKO in creation of a women’s association of peacekeepers, which will soon have an online presence.

Within the U.S. government more widely defined, the State Department’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) must work alongside this effort, by bridging the gaps for women civilians interested in working within the U.N. The current state of this effort is extremely short-sighted; the IO website for example, suggests that Americans work to become Junior Professional Officers, a U.N recruitment program for which Americans are ineligible. Coordinating entry into the U.N. on the civilian side is a place where the U.S. has a comparative advantage. With the large pool of talented State Department and DOD women coming back from hardship posts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is poised to contribute quality talent. IO, INL and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations must work alongside this effort; to reform the qualities sought in staff.

2.8 Once adopted, the National Action Plan (NAP) should receive support and full funding by Congress.
There exists a great opportunity for the United States to address these challenges in the development of the National Action Plan on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325. In a commitment made by Secretary Clinton in 2010, development of the National Action Plan (NAP) will serve as the U.S. blueprint for work on women in peace and security. In other countries, a NAP can serve as a vehicle to improved participation of women in the U.N. In 2009, Chile’s NAP focused almost exclusively on the participation of women in the armed forces, putting particular emphasis on the role of Chilean troops in peace support operations. As a result, Chile increased its numbers of women in peacekeeping operations. NAPs in Belgium, Denmark, and Norway also include strategies for increasing numbers of women serving multinational efforts and

50 In the case of DOD this includes some 200,000 women veterans.
52 Donadio and Mazzotta, “Gender Perspective and International Security.”
have each been successful. The NAP is an appropriate place for connecting and coordinating various government agencies on this effort.

“Send me your female troops, your police, your civilian personnel and your senior diplomats and I will ensure that they are all considered; that qualified candidates are rostered; and that the maximum number is deployed to the field as quickly as humanly possible.” This call from U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2008 has yet to be answered by the United States. As a composite, the action-oriented recommendations set forth here will allow the U.S. to fulfill a critical role in the U.N.’s ability to protect and secure. They go beyond merely material resources to become a contribution of skillful, valuable human resources.

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**Missions and TCCs of Merit**

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| FPUS | India (11%, 1 Unit of 100 women) | Bangladesh (13%, 1 Unit of 123 women) | UNMIL (16%) | MINUSTAH (9%) |

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56 Ibid.
Preventing Violence Against Women in Peacekeeping Operations

Introduction

Throughout history, war has disrupted and destroyed communities. Often those powerless and most at peril are women and their children. One of the goals of peacekeeping is to protect civilians and create a secure environment, and peacekeepers must give priority to the security needs of women and girls. Two issues in particular command attention from peacekeepers: (1) Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) committed by combatants and other members of the local community during conflicts, and (2) Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed by peacekeepers themselves.

The Role of Peacekeeping in Preventing SGBV

The important role that peacekeeping operations can play in preventing SGBV and effectively addressing the needs of its victims is touched upon throughout this Report. Adequate funding for peacekeeping operations allows the deployment of adequate numbers of qualified peacekeepers. As Chapter 2 notes, among the advantages of having greater numbers on women in peacekeeping operations and in leadership in peacekeeping are the beneficial impact they can have in discouraging SGBV, investigating acts of SGBV, and aiding the women who are victims of SGBV. Chapter 3 mentions that the proper training of peacekeepers will include training regarding civilian protection and the prevention of SGBV. And the growing reliance on civilian and police capacity, discussed in Chapter 4, will include a growing reliance on these peacekeepers for investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of these crimes and addressing the needs of the victims.

What is lacking are (i) continual in-mission training of peacekeepers on SGBV, and (ii) evaluation of the impact of that training. Troop contributing countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries (PCCs) must step up to prepare mission staff and create new accountability mechanisms. U.S. training institutes and programs have a key role to play in coordinating the development of new training and evaluation mechanisms and ensuring that programs with a significant gender dimension are funded.
Victim assistance, identified by the U.N. as a priority, is an area in which the U.S. military has experience. Pentagon figures show that nearly one-third of women veterans say that they were victims of rape or assault while they were serving. Commanders and leaders who have had experience dealing with this sensitive issue would be prepared to work with victims of SGBV around the world. It is a skill-set possessed by qualified men and women. As the Zeid Report notes, “The presence of more women in a mission, especially at senior levels, will help to promote an environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly of the local population.”

It is worth mentioning that combating SGBV generally involves improving the status of women in the host country and strengthening the local capacity to address discriminatory practices and their impact. Both UNSCR 1325 (in operational paragraphs 10 and 11) and UNSCR 1820 addressed the need of peacekeeping operations to combat SGBV in broad contexts. In the lead up to the adoption of UNSCR 1820, a wide range of information about SGBV in areas where peacekeepers work was collected and developed, including the Wilton Park Report. With the development of the new doctrine and considerable resources (including a recent inventory of best practices by UNACTION), peacekeeping operations work to address SGBV within the context of protection.

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5 Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) “Calls on all parties to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.”  
Novel and forward-leaning programs such as Joint Protection Teams (deployed to MONUSCO in 2010) are increasing the overall technical capacity of peacekeeping missions on SGBV. This is a significant step forward, since deployment of gender units cannot be considered sufficient for ensuring protection of women and girls across the country.8

Building on UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888 called for improved early warning systems and data collection around SGBV.9 As a part of one of the most organized intelligence operations in the world, the U.S. military should investigate the advantages of supporting this development, specifically through the office of Margot Wallstrom, Special Advisor to the Secretary General on Sexual Violence. Monitoring and evaluation are key, and while agencies such as the U.N.’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have figured out the formula, DPKO needs additional resources to follow suit. DOD should also consider the integration of new training modules developed by UNACTION, to reframe its own training on SGBV.

Meeting the Challenges of SEA in Peacekeeping

Among the most disturbing shortcomings of peacekeeping operations are the too frequently occurring incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed by U.N. peacekeeping forces. What could be more treacherous than peacekeepers turning on the civilians they were sent to protect? Many excellent reports have been written on this issue, and it is not the place of this Report to duplicate that work. However, in light of the gravity of this issue, this Report will summarize the U.N.’s efforts to respond to the perpetration of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers operating under its authority and make recommendations for improvement.

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Allegations and proof of sexual misconduct by some peacekeepers cast doubt on the legitimacy of U.N. peacekeeping and undermine the U.N. as a whole. U.S. citizens and their leaders appropriately demand remedial action. Some have gone so far as to call for a moratorium on new peacekeeping missions partially due to such “unconscionable acts of misconduct.”

Past allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers, especially in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia, tarnished the credibility of the U.N. In 2004 widespread incidents of prostitution, rape, trades that involved sex for food or aid assistance, and exploitation of minors came to light. This revealed a culture of impunity, domination, and lack of accountability that contributed to the perpetration and continuation of these egregious acts.

In response, the U.N. Secretary-General announced in 2005 a “No Tolerance on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Campaign.” DPKO’s Conduct and Discipline Unit was tasked with implementation of a three-tiered strategy of improved prevention, enforcement, and remedial action. Since then, changes in the terms and implementation of the Code of Conduct have increased peacekeeper buy-in and the accountability of leadership. For example, the U.N. may take action on prosecution in the instance that a host country fails to do so. However, success is built largely on mission-level planning, resources, and will. Many missions host Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) who work closely with the Gender Advisor to provide induction training and code of conduct management.

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12 Martin, “Must Boys be Boys?”

13 It stated, “We cannot tolerate even one instance of a United Nations peacekeeper victimizing the most vulnerable among us … such behavior violates the fundamental ‘duty of care’ that United Nations peacekeepers owe to the very peoples they are sent to protect and serve. The basic policy is clear: zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse of any kind.”


16 U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services Conduct and Discipline Unit, see: cdu.unlb.org.
Preventing Violence Against Women in Peacekeeping Operations

These teams have launched outreach campaigns to ensure that the local population understands the process for filing an allegation and to call upon the U.N.’s partners (including NGOs) to report any allegations of which they become aware. In UNMIL, the Joint Program on SGBV introduced an internal awareness-raising campaign “Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” As a result the number of SEA cases reported there declined significantly, as they have across U.N. peacekeeping operation missions since 2009.17 The success of the U.N.’s approach to addressing SEA among peacekeepers has led NATO to consult with U.N. officials on best practices.

U.N. peacekeeping troops come from the Member States, and the ultimate responsibility for punishing SEA perpetrators rests with the national governments of the offenders. The U.N. has strict protocols in place regarding SEA. If a U.N. staff member is the subject of an allegation, the U.N. investigates. If the accused perpetrator is a peacekeeping soldier, then the Member State can investigate or ask the U.N. to do so. If a Member State fails to investigate, then the U.N. will carry out an investigation on its own. Violations result in repatriating the perpetrators to their home countries to face legal repercussions and disciplinary measures. Furthermore, to increase transparency, the U.N. now issues quarterly press releases to publicize updated statistics regarding sexual exploitation and abuse cases in field missions.

The U.N. also provides assistance to victims through its sexual exploitation and abuse victim assistance mechanism in every country where it operates. This provides victims with access to the services they need, including medical, legal, psychosocial, and immediate care. One can learn more about how the U.N. responds to cases of sexual misconduct, at the website of the U.N.’s Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Task Force at http://www.un.org/en/pseataskforce/.

Several best practice approaches have emerged, and we recommend that the United States use its votes and influence at the United Nations in furtherance of these:

17 According to the United Nations office of Internal Oversight Services Conduct and Discipline Unit, see: cdu.unlb.org.
1. **Collaboration with host governments to build a strategic framework to address SGBV in national institutions** (e.g., MONUC’s work with the DRC National Strategy on SGBV, which combines efforts of the government, donor community and senior U.N. leadership);\(^{18}\)

2. **Coordination of efforts through sub-groups and country-level thematic groups** (e.g., UNMIL’s leadership of the U.N. Country Team Sub Group on SGBV which together efforts from U.N. Women, UNFPA and UNICEF on operational tasks including a gender sensitive DDRR);\(^{19}\)

3. **Build community capacity to sustain attention to SGBV within the national security sector** (e.g., strengthening the justice system through a new SGBV crimes units in Liberia, Child Protection Units in Haiti, and training for all judges and lawyers in Chad);\(^{20}\)

4. **Raise awareness and support for local initiatives** (e.g., new domestic violence law by UNMIT in Timore-Leste and UNAMA’s lobbying efforts for a CEDAW-relevant violence against women act).\(^{21}\)

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid. Signed into law by the Afghanistan parliament in 2009.
Chapter 3
Training and Equipping Peacekeepers

Paul D. Williams
George Washington University
Introduction

In order for a peacekeeping mission to be successful, peacekeepers must be appropriately trained and equipped. As the current chair of the U.N. Security Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations recently put it, “Deploying troops with the necessary training, equipment and logistical support to effectively undertake the complex and potentially dangerous task faced by peacekeepers remains a key determinant of an operation’s success.”1 “Training” includes training in skills specialized to peacekeeping operations and to the location of particular peacekeeping missions. “Equipment” includes assets to enable combat, defense and protection, mobility, communications, and intelligence-gathering, as well as medical equipment and logistics.

These issues have once again come under the spotlight as U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere have failed to protect civilians from atrocity crimes. In their defense, the peacekeepers pointed out that they lacked military utility and attack helicopters, armored personnel carriers, communications technologies, specialists in combat, engineering, medicine, and intelligence, and were given only limited guidance and training on how to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Some question whether the peacekeepers and the governments that contribute them to peacekeeping operations have the political will to engage in the full range of tasks for which they were deployed. But there is no doubt that peacekeepers who are adequately trained and equipped are more capable of fulfilling their responsibilities.

The U.N. continues to face major shortfalls in both training and equipping. One basic difficulty is measuring the dimensions of the challenge. A lack of agreed standards2 has left the U.N. unable to measure field performance and levels of preparedness among its troop/police contributing countries (T/PCCs). In May 2010, an audit of the U.N.’s Office of Military Affairs concluded that there was “no methodology or standards for the evaluation of the performance of military contingent units in peacekeeping missions.”3 Certifying standards will enable the U.N. to identify deficiencies in the field, criticize under-performers, and make recommendations for improvement. Of course, some Member States, including the United States, may at times not want the U.N. to have the opportunity or authority to evaluate the performance of their military units. Another challenge is interoperability.


2 The U.N. defines peacekeeping training standards as “a course or curriculum outline that defines the overall training objective, identifies the target audience required to complete the training and sets out the specific learning outcomes for each topic covered during the training.” Report of the Secretary-General, Report on the progress of training in peacekeeping, (U.N. document A/65/644, December 21, 2010), paragraph 10.

As the U.N. conducts more multidimensional peace operations it needs to further integrate its training procedures to ensure military, police, and other civilian personnel can be trained together. Specialist areas such as civilian protection and “robust” peacekeeping also require further training mechanisms, including on the use of force, decision-making and command, arrest and detention, crowd control, riot control, and protection of U.N. personnel and facilities.4

But the U.N. has also had significant success in implementing important reform initiatives, most notably under its New Horizons framework (discussed below). The U.N. Department of Field Support (DFS) is busy developing a Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) which will enable the U.N. to provide equipment and logistical support to peacekeepers more efficiently. The U.N. has also nearly completed a training package to provide peacekeepers with guidance on how to protect civilians. And it has done this while retaining its cost-effectiveness: In 2009-10, the U.N. sustained approximately 100,000 peacekeepers worldwide at a cost of $7.75 billion. During roughly the same period, U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and neighboring theatres involved about twice as many troops but were around twenty times more expensive ($150.4 billion).5

As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States has played a crucial role in authorizing the organization’s complex peace operations. It is therefore important that the U.S. government aligns its positions within the key U.N. decision-making forums to support these missions, primarily the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) and the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (which handles budgetary and administrative issues). Moreover, since U.S. armed services are among the best trained and equipped forces in the world, Washington has a unique and valuable role to play in training and equipping peacekeepers, both those from the U.S. and those from around the world.

With regard to training and equipping peacekeepers, the two central issues facing the U.S. government are how to enhance its own contributions to international peacekeeping operations, and how to strengthen the peacekeeping capabilities of other countries and organizations. Since the so-called “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia in October 1993, the U.S. has deployed very few of its own uniformed personnel to U.N. peacekeeping

4 The unpublished Draft DPKO/DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping (DPKO/DFS, 2010) provides an interim definition of robust peacekeeping as “a posture by a peacekeeping operation that demonstrates willingness, capacity and capability to deter and confront, including through the use of force when necessary, an obstruction to the implementation of its mandate,” p. 3.

The U.S. has played a major role in NATO’s operations in the Balkans, but with regard to the U.N., it has focused on training peacekeepers from other countries. This aversion to placing troop contingents under U.N. command has had the detrimental effect of leaving the U.S. with no military commanders in current U.N. peacekeeping missions and a gap in Washington’s institutional memory of how such U.N. operations work.

United States training to foreign peacekeepers is primarily delivered through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. GPOI and ACOTA have done a good and highly cost-effective job of training and equipping other countries’ peacekeepers. But Washington’s unwillingness to contribute significant numbers of its own personnel to U.N. operations has generated accusations that the United States prefers “burden-dumping” on U.N. troop contributing countries rather than “burden-sharing.” U.N. Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon recently argued that the problem stems from the fact that “those who mandate [U.N.] missions, those who contribute uniformed personnel and those who are major funders are separate groups.” In such circumstances, he concluded that “tensions and divisions are inevitable, with potentially negative impacts on our operations.”

Guatemala’s representative to the U.N. described the situation in less diplomatic terms as “an accident waiting to happen.”

Recent Developments in U.N. Policies on Training and Equipping Peacekeepers

Peacekeepers require a daunting range of skills: they must be combat-capable but also skilled negotiators and mediators; they need general knowledge of the U.N. system, mandates, and rules of engagement but also an understanding of civil-military cooperation to effectively interact with humanitarian agencies and local populations; and they require mission-specific knowledge of local politics, history, customs, culture, language, and conflict dynamics as well as more general skills to protect civilians from imminent violence.

Current efforts to train and equip peacekeepers are conceived as part of the

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7 A warning was raised about this three years ago by William J. Durch in “Peace and Stability Operations: Challenges and Opportunities for the Next U.S. Administration,” (Washington, DC, Henry L. Stimson Center and the Better World Campaign, 2008), p. 8.


The U.N.'s “New Horizons” agenda.\textsuperscript{10} This has focused the U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts on four areas: (1) Policy development; (2) Capability development; (3) Global field support strategy; and (4) Planning and oversight. Training and equipment issues fall primarily under “Capability development,” which is understood to include identifying, building, and sustaining the required capabilities to support peacekeeping now and into the future. More specifically, this includes filling critical gaps in a sustainable manner, developing a stronger performance culture, and engaging in more effective outreach to peacekeeping contributors and coordination of capability-building assistance.\textsuperscript{11} Providing equipment to peacekeepers will also hinge on the successful development of the global field support strategy led by the Department of Field Support (DFS).

The U.N.’s plan is to link clear operational tasks and standards with capacity-building and training programs for U.N. Member States and relevant partner institutions, equipment and support needs, and, as appropriate, incentives to deliver mandated tasks. It is generally acknowledged that this capability-driven approach represents a useful advance on the traditional numbers-driven approach to force generation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. As the New Horizon document explains, the capability-driven approach emphasizes the need to generate the skills, capacity, and willingness to deliver required results as much as on generating specific numbers of peacekeepers.

In this context, U.N. peacekeeping training is a responsibility shared by a variety of actors and organized around three phases: (1) Pre-deployment, (2) Induction, and (3) Ongoing training. Member States are responsible for pre-deployment training of uniformed personnel. Induction, ongoing, and all civilian training, on the other hand, is the responsibility of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS), and the field missions (each of which should develop its own mission training plan that incorporates strategic- as well as mission-level priorities). The U.N. conceptualizes its “training cycle” as identifying and prioritizing training needs, setting standards, ensuring efficient delivery, and outlining new systems for monitoring and evaluating the impact of training. Training differs depending on whether it is for individuals or contingents but it usually takes the form of either classroom instruction or field drills.

In July 2010, a DPKO/DFS working group approved a set of strategic and cross-cutting level training priorities. Priorities listed as mandatory for all peacekeeping personnel were: pre-deployment and induction training, sexual exploitation and abuse awareness and prevention (as well as Code


of Conduct ongoing training), HIV/AIDS orientation, Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE), basic and advanced Security in the Field courses, and classes on ethics and integrity in the workplace.

By December 2010, the U.N. Secretary-General was able to conclude that “the peacekeeping training architecture has been put in place” and the “overall strategy and policy documents have established a shared understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and entities involved in peacekeeping training.” This included 35 substantive and support components which have been identified in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, all of which require job-specific and technical training standards.

With this training architecture in place, the U.N’s ongoing priorities have focused on overcoming several challenges. First, there is an ongoing attempt to develop standards to address cross-cutting, job-specific, and technical priorities. Second, the Secretariat is trying to improve the availability and quality of information and knowledge management mechanisms to allow for improved coordination and decision-making on training. This includes efforts to make the curriculum for more courses available electronically to facilitate distance learning. Third, there is a clear need to design and implement monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure the agreed standards are being attained.

Shortcomings in U.N. Policies on Training and Equipping Peacekeepers

Despite making significant progress over the last decade, U.N. peacekeeping still suffers from a variety of shortcomings related to training and equipment. A central problem facing all these initiatives is the continued lack of "consistent and predictable resources." Indeed, despite the importance of training, this year has seen the U.N.’s training budget reduced by 60 percent.

Other shortcomings in training are varied. There is, for example, a widely acknowledged need for more simulation-based training methods and for trainees to undergo some sort of pre- or post-training assessment. The specialist tasks involved in training peacekeepers to implement civilian protection mandates and undertake “robust” operations have also generated considerable headaches.

In November 2009, Security Council Resolution 1894 tasked the Secretary-

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13 Ibid., paragraphs 3 and 52.
General with developing an operational concept for the protection of civilians and to provide peacekeepers and senior mission leaders with relevant training, both pre-deployment and in-mission. (Resolutions 1820 and 1888 had previously tasked the Secretariat with developing guidance and training on addressing sexual violence in armed conflict. See Preventing Violence Against Women in Peacekeeping Operations on page 44 of this Report.) DPKO finalized its operational concept on civilian protection earlier this year and has nearly completed the accompanying training package.  

The U.N.’s equipment deficiencies have been highlighted in various iterations of its military and civilian “gaps lists” which it has produced since 2009. These lists have identified several important thematic and mission-specific equipment and skills gaps. The main mission-specific gaps remain in Africa, especially within the U.N. Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the U.N.-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). At the thematic level the gaps can be summarized as follows:

Military Gaps: The differences between the force requirements set by the U.N.’s Military Planning Service and the troops and assets contributed to the mission. The principal challenges relate to mobility gaps (e.g., military utility helicopters, transport and reconnaissance aircraft), niche gaps (e.g., medical units, special forces, engineers, or mine clearance), information-gathering gaps (e.g., communication and analytical skills as well as equipment to enhance situational awareness such as unmanned aerial vehicles), infrastructure gaps (e.g., Level-II hospitals, logistics bases), and self-sustainment gaps (e.g., relating to troop quality and equipment). Of all the military gaps, perhaps the most urgent is in military utility and attack helicopters, especially for those missions operating in inhospitable natural environments and unstable political environments. By April 2011, the U.N. was anticipating a shortfall of 56 out of 137 authorized military helicopters. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, since July 2011 MONUSCO has been forced to operate without any attack helicopters, whereas it once had eight. This has left it unable to move proactively against rebel groups in the Kivus and jungle areas and greatly reduced its deterrent capabilities. In addition, 31 of MONUSCO’s 93 temporary and company operating bases can be reached only by air. A lack of utility helicopters thus seriously restricts MONUSCO operations, and in some of the DRC’s most dangerous territories.  

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15 The four modules in the package provide an overview of the protection concept, the international legal dimensions of civilian protection, how the protection concept relates to U.N. peacekeeping operations, and issues involved in planning and operationalization.

Civilian Gaps: The principal challenges stem from justice and rule of law gaps, policing gaps (e.g., well-trained Formed Police Units (FPUs), female officers and French-speaking personnel), gaps in experts on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programs, mine action, and corrections officers. It is likely that the U.N. Civilian Gaps List will be subsumed into the mechanisms that are developed as a result of the recent report, Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict. Nevertheless, substantial concerns remain regarding not only the shortage of civilian experts, but also the relevance of the current civilian experts in the field. As one participant in the Security Council’s Istanbul Retreat put it, in some missions, “we probably have the right numbers but the wrong people.”

These gaps persist, in part, because the U.N.’s reimbursement rates no longer cover the overall expenses of troop contributing countries. But many national government structures are also not well adapted to generate, incentivize, train, and equip adequate numbers of military and civilian personnel respectively, and certainly not in a timely manner. Commonly cited barriers to peacekeeping contributions include hostile or indifferent public opinion, financial burdens, legal/constitutional factors, insufficient understanding of U.N. requirements, concerns about U.N. command and control procedures, and a lack of relevant training. Many countries do not, for instance, have peacekeeping training centers or peacekeeping structures built into their ministry of defense, or peacekeeping courses available to their police and civilian personnel. Others have only recently established such structures, and it takes time to get the subsequent processes functioning smoothly.

In the U.S., the interagency system is not well organized for generating timely positive responses to U.N. requests for assistance. Typically, the U.N. “gaps lists” are initially transmitted to the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, usually to the U.S. Military Advisor. From there, the requests are passed to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in the Department of State (DOS) and the Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in the Department of Defense (DOD). After a period of consultation with their counterparts, State Department officials draft a cable back to the U.N. summarizing the U.S. response. This process should be streamlined and the time period required should be reliably short. Another problem is that the U.N.’s requests tend to get reviewed at the deputy assistant secretary level at State and Defense, officials who do not always have the power to push a request through the higher reaches of the interagency system. In

contrast, the senior-level decision-makers, including those on the National Security Council at the White House, who could push such requests through the bureaucracy, are often not engaged.  

An additional barrier in the U.S. case is the U.N. Participation Act of 1945. This limits the amount of assistance the United States can provide directly to U.N. peacekeeping operations – beyond those in the State Department’s Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA) and U.S. assessed dues to the U.N. peacekeeping budget – to no more than $3 million per mission per year. This limit can only be exceeded with a presidential waiver, which is only sought in exceptional circumstances. In practical terms, this has put severe limits on the amount of transportation assistance the United States can provide to move troops/equipment to U.N. missions.

The U.S. Government’s Approach

The Obama Administration has suggested that strengthening the ability of the U.N. and various regional organizations to conduct effective peacekeeping operations is a matter of national security. In late 2009, the Administration launched a Presidential Peacekeeping Initiative which saw the U.S. president, for the first time, engage directly with some of the U.N.’s largest TCCs. At this meeting, President Obama acknowledged that “U.N. peacekeeping can deliver important results by protecting civilians, helping to rebuild security, and advancing peace around the world” and that it was “in all of our interests to improve [peacekeeping’s] efficiency and effectiveness.” “To succeed,” Obama continued, “U.N. missions and contributors need to be better equipped and supported to fulfill ambitious mandates. ... We are willing to consider contributing more U.S. civilian police, civilian personnel, and military staff officers to U.N. missions.”

President Obama’s initiative certainly highlighted the importance of U.N. peacekeeping. But it did not generate a big increase in U.S. peacekeeping contributions, and there was no obvious sustained political follow-through. It was widely noticed internationally that the President would not even consider contributing U.S. troop contingents to U.N. peacekeeping

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missions. Despite the positive rhetoric, the number of U.S. police, civilians, and military staff officers deployed to U.N. missions remained stagnant. The situation is not helped by the fact that the promotion system in the U.S. military does not encourage deployments to U.N. missions. Consequently, the Department of Defense could take the useful proactive step of reforming the promotion system in the armed forces to ensure that service in U.N. missions enhances the promotion prospects of uniformed personnel.

Two years later, Obama’s presidential initiative appears to have languished. Of course, the U.S. continues to pay just over one-quarter of the U.N.’s peacekeeping budget, but this commitment is under direct attack from some members of Congress. On August 31, 2011, for example, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, proposed legislation – The United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011 – that would condition U.S. payment of peacekeeping assessments upon the performance of certain actions by the U.N. and would, in some cases, require the U.S. to veto any future U.N. peacekeeping missions.

The list of U.S. government organizations working directly to train and equip peacekeepers is short, and almost solely focused on training non-Americans rather than Americans. The flagship U.S. programs are GPOI and ACOTA. Established in 2004 as part of a G-8 initiative, GPOI is a State Department-managed mechanism that has provided training and equipment to help approximately 60 partner countries conduct more effective peacekeeping operations. Now in its second phase of operations (FY2010-14), GPOI has shifted focus from training by U.S. trainers to enhancing the self-sufficiency of GPOI partner states to train peacekeepers on their own. Debate continues over what skills need to be imparted to individuals or contingents to count as being “trained” peacekeepers.

23 The President of the United States can deploy U.S. personnel to U.N. missions using two principal sources of authority. First, the amended Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 permits the President to detail up to 1,000 members of the U.S. armed forces to the U.N. in a noncombatant capacity. Second, section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to provide U.S. armed forces personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Such personnel may be detailed or sent to provide "technical, scientific or professional advice or service" to any international organization. With regard to U.S. civilian police, the United States currently contracts with outside firms to hire either active duty on a leave of absence, former, or retired police officers. They are hired for a year at a time and paid by the contractor. See Marjorie Ann Browne, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, (Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, August 13, 2010), p. 18.

24 As of July 31, 2011, the U.S. contributed 100 uniformed personnel to U.N. peacekeeping missions (75 police, and 25 military personnel). This is an increase of just 16 personnel from September 30, 2009 when the U.S. contributed 65 police, and 19 military personnel. For a country that spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined and that claims to be interested in promoting international peace and security, these figures should raise serious questions.

25 Various contractor firms under the State Department’s AFRICAP program also provide relevant training and equipment to some African TCCs and PCCs, principally those that contributed to African Union missions in Sudan and Somalia.
With the international peacekeeping spotlight regularly falling on Africa, attention has focused on ACOTA, a State Department, Bureau of African Affairs Program that works with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Africa Command, to provide field training for African peacekeepers, staff training, and exercises for battalion, brigade, and multinational force headquarters personnel. It is based on U.N.-approved programs of instruction and also provides equipment for relevant African trainers and peacekeepers. Since 1997, ACOTA has provided training and non-lethal equipment to over 176,000 peacekeepers from African partner militaries in 206 contingent units. ACOTA’s 25 partner countries make their own decision on whether to deploy ACOTA-trained troops, but the ACOTA training and equipment helps them make that decision.

The other relevant institution is the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). The Army’s only organization focused on peacekeeping training issues, PKSOI has an authorized strength of 50 personnel (up from 20 in 2005) supplemented by various associates and an intern program. In recent years, PKSOI personnel have been engaged in doctrine-writing for the U.S. military, collaborated with Harvard University to produce the Mass Atrocity Response Operations military handbook, and helped author a U.N. Mission Commanders’ Guidance Handbook. PKSOI also works with the U.N. on training issues, notably through the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC).
The existence of these institutions does not mean peacekeeping is a high priority for the U.S. government. Of course, “stability operations” have now become “a core U.S. military mission,” but while this concept overlaps with peacekeeping, it is not synonymous. For one thing, the U.S. concept of stability operations makes no mention of protecting civilians, a core function of many ongoing U.N. missions. Nor has the change in the military status of stability operations significantly altered U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Indeed, judging by the latest U.S. National Military Strategy, the Department of Defense remains largely uninterested in peacekeeping. The strategy document makes no mention of peacekeeping, except to say the United States will help build capacity for other actors to do such things in Africa. Indeed, while trumpeting the importance of U.S. “leadership in the international order” and calling for “thinking anew about how we lead,” it neglects to mention how the U.S. has failed to lead by example on U.N. peacekeeping, which deploys more soldiers overseas than any global actor other than the U.S. and NATO.

26 In Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 (September 16, 2009), “stability operations” are intended “to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief,” paragraph 3.

Despite the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, there is unlikely to be a sizable “peacekeeping dividend” for the U.N., principally because the military budget and number of personnel will be reduced and the Iraqi and Afghan militaries are likely to be given priority when it comes to donating non-essential U.S. military assets and equipment. Nevertheless, it would be short-sighted of the U.S. government not to enhance its own contributions to U.N. peace operations and help train and equip peacekeepers from other countries. As one former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. correctly concluded, “More U.S. personnel in U.N. headquarters and peacekeeping operations in the field would provide much needed expertise, offer key links back to the Pentagon, and encourage other troop contributing nations to participate as well.”\(^\text{28}\) With this in mind, we recommend that the U.S. government:

3.1 **Reinvigorate the Presidential Peacekeeping Initiative.**

Reinvigorating the Presidential Peacekeeping Initiative is important for several reasons. Not only will it help ensure that U.S. support for peacekeeping does not become an easy target for spending cuts in this period of austerity, it should also articulate why and how international peacekeeping is important for the U.S. national security strategy. High-profile initiatives by the President are important but the central messages must be consistently reinforced through visible follow-up actions by senior decision-makers in the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. One place to start might be to kick-start a debate over raising or removing the current limits imposed on U.S. transportation assistance to U.N. peacekeeping operations by the United Nations Participation Act (1945).

3.2 **Deploy a military contingent or pledge “over-the-horizon” military support to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, preferably in Africa.**

Ideally, DOD should develop a timetable to deploy a sizable U.S. military contingent (of several hundred troops) to a U.N. peacekeeping mission. Given the strong U.S. ties to Liberia, the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) would be one obvious choice. This would not only make a real difference on the ground but would significantly enhance U.S. credibility and leadership potential on peacekeeping by helping to close the growing divide between those who authorize, those who pay for, and those who deploy troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations. If the U.S. government rejects such a deployment, it should demonstrate its support for U.N. peacekeeping by providing “over-the-horizon” military support to strengthen the credibility and deterrent power of U.N. missions.

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and help them deal with unforeseen crises. Possible models are Britain’s Joint Reaction Force deployed outside Sierra Leone in 2000 in support of U.N. and British troops, the U.S. Joint Task Force in support of West African peacekeepers in Liberia in 2003, and the European Union’s reserve force deployed to Kinshasa and Gabon to provide rapid reaction support to U.N. peacekeepers in the DRC during the presidential election period of 2006. Indeed, with presidential elections once again looming in the Democratic Republic of Congo, providing over-the-horizon support to MONUSCO would be an obvious choice.

3.3 **Set rising numerical targets for placing relevant U.S. personnel in U.N. mission staffs.**
DOD and the State Department should set rising numerical targets for placing U.S. staff officers, police development personnel, political advisors, and relevant civilians, especially women, with expertise in areas such as infrastructure repair, DDR, SSR, de-mining, and human rights in U.N. peacekeeping missions. Getting such people into U.N. mission staffs would be a low-cost, high pay-off strategy which could occur with limited investment in preparation, awareness-raising, and support for individual career paths.

3.4 **Support the certification and operationalization of U.N. training standards.**
The United States should provide strong political and some financial support to help the U.N. complete its training standards, including in-theater performance indicators for infantry battalions. Attention should also be given to helping the U.N. integrate its training procedures to ensure military, police, and other civilian personnel can be trained together to improve interoperability in multidimensional and integrated missions. U.S. political support for this process is most urgently required in the C-34 and the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee. Once relevant training standards are certified, the United States should help ensure that they are adopted throughout the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers.

3.5 **Work with key partner countries to support priority training initiatives within the U.N. Secretariat.**
The United States is well-placed to work with key partner countries to help the U.N. Secretariat complete several important initiatives that would result in better trained and equipped peacekeepers. The current reduction in the U.N.‘s training budget has put some of these initiatives in jeopardy. The United States should therefore support:

3.5.1 The production and dissemination of the U.N. training manual of capability standards for infantry battalions which has been
initiated as part of DPKO’s “Peacekeeping Vision 2015” initiative.

3.5.2 Intensive training courses for potential Force Commanders and other senior mission staff whose selection is critical to mission success. The United States should also investigate the possibility of deploying in-theatre training teams to deliver intensive in-mission courses to supplement U.N. ongoing training efforts.

3.5.3 A proposal in the C-34 to curtail the use by T/PCCs of national caveats that inhibit the implementation of peacekeeping mandates in their memorandums of understanding with DPKO.

3.5.4 Studies to evaluate the outcomes of current U.N. training initiatives. Such studies are essential for discerning which aspects of U.N. training are working and which need further reform.

3.5.5 Field-based training needs analyses to enhance the U.N.’s ongoing training mechanisms. Subsequent findings should then be taken to the C-34 to serve as a basis for reform proposals.

3.5.6 DPKO’s efforts to make its training curriculum electronically available thereby increasing the potential for peacekeepers to be trained through distance learning, web-based courses.

3.6 Strengthen the operational and tactical dimensions of peacekeeping operations in Africa by increasing funding to the ACOTA program.

The United States should channel more funding and trainers to strengthen the operational and tactical dimensions of peacekeeping operations by enhancing the depth and amount of training provided by the GPOI and especially ACOTA programs. ACOTA is particularly important because Africa will remain the focus of many peacekeeping challenges for the foreseeable future. The current plan to cut GPOI’s Fiscal Year 2012 budget request by approximately 7 percent is a short-sighted step in the wrong direction.

3.7 Share intelligence with U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The U.S. intelligence community should share situational analysis information with U.N. peacekeepers in the field. This type of information management is crucial for a range of tasks but particularly those related to civilian protection. The obvious initial repository for such information would be the Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) which are now established in most of the U.N.’s multidimensional
peacekeeping operations. JMACs are tasked with gathering, analyzing and synthesizing information, including intelligence-related material, to prepare integrated analyses to support mission planning.29 Ultimately, however, while most JMACs sit at mission headquarters, sector level commanders within U.N. missions must also be able to develop an organic intelligence gathering capacity.

3.8 **Donate relevant equipment to help fill capability gaps identified in the U.N. “gaps lists.”**

The United States government should donate relevant equipment (and crews) and logistical support to help fill the identified capability gaps in U.N. peacekeeping missions. Particularly urgent equipment gaps include 4x4 vehicles, armored personnel carriers, unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as military utility and attack helicopters.

3.9 **Empower the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to increase its collaboration with international training centers.**

Authorize and fund the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) to work with emerging centers of training excellence. Since the most likely source of future peacekeepers is Asia and Africa, PKSOI should develop partnerships with equivalent institutes across these regions. But it should also increase its collaboration with world-leading centers in this field such as the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).

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29 Although the U.N. is often depicted as prone to leaking sensitive information, a recent study of all the U.N.’s field JMACs concluded they “have proved capable of protecting the confidentiality of such information against leaks to the host government, to the national governments of staff members and to the public at large.” Melanie Ramjoué, “Improving U.N. Intelligence through Civil-Military Collaboration: Lessons from the Joint Mission Analysis Centres,” *International Peacekeeping*, 2011, p. 482.
During the early 1990’s, the United States assessment rate for peacekeeping hovered between 30-32%.\(^1\) Effective in the 1995 fiscal year, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act added a provision instituting a 25% cap on United States contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations and establishing a number of reporting requirements regarding those contributions.\(^2\)

This cap, which remains in place today and must be revisited by Congress every year, caused the United States to accumulate significant arrears during the mid to late 1990s. These arrears were exacerbated by Congress’ unwillingness to fully fund the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets. In late 1999, this situation came to a head when U.S. debt to the world body’s peacekeeping and regular budgets, totaling over one billion dollars, nearly cost the United States its vote in the General Assembly. In response to this ballooning debt and the deleterious impact it was having on the ability of the United States to advance its interests at the U.N., Clinton Administration officials and Congressional leaders agreed, in the Helms-Biden Act, to the payment of a portion of U.S. arrears on the achievement of certain reforms at the U.N. and a lowering of U.S. assessment rates.\(^3\)

While the Helms-Biden agreement did pave the way for substantial payments of back dues accrued during the late 1990s, the United States continued to accumulate debt to the U.N. during the Bush Administration. Congress did pass legislation raising the peacekeeping cap and allowing the U.S. to pay its peacekeeping dues at their full assessed rates between Calendar Years 2001 and 2004, but it failed to do so between 2005 and 2007, resulting in an additional $175 million in debt to U.N. peacekeeping.


\(^2\) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Public Law 103-236, 103rd Cong, (June 8, 1993), 404 (b) (2), 407.

\(^3\) The Helms-Biden agreement, as it came to be known, was enacted as part of the FY 2000 Omnibus Appropriations Act on November 29, 1999. This agreement conditioned the payment of $819 million in back dues and the application of $107 million in credits owed to the U.S. by the U.N. on—among other benchmarks—the U.N. reducing U.S. assessment rates for the U.N. regular budget from 25% to 22% and the peacekeeping budget from over 30% to 25%. (Marjorie Ann Browne, “United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues,” (RL33611, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, January 14, 2011).
The Bush Administration also frequently underfunded the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA) in its budget requests due to unrealistic budget projections, despite its support for the creation of new missions in places like Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan, and Darfur. In the report accompanying its FY 2009 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, the Senate Committee on Appropriations rebuked the Administration for this practice, stating, “The Committee notes that the budget request for U.S. assessed contributions to international peacekeeping missions assumed a reduction in the cost of every mission below the fiscal year 2008 operating level, yet the United States voted in the U.N. Security Council to expand the mandate of peacekeeping missions.... The Committee does not support OMB’s [the Office of Management and Budget’s] practice of under-funding peacekeeping activities and relying on limited supplemental funds to support only a few missions.”

Chapter 4
Standing Civilian and Police Capacity
Jonathan Benton
Introduction

Increasing the standing and available civilian and police capacity for international peacekeeping is an acute need to improve the success of international peacekeeping operations and should be a priority actively sought by the United States.

Peacekeeping operations aimed at complex challenges require more than military peacekeepers. Since 1960, a civilian police function has been seen as a necessary part of peace operations. The civilian component to peacekeeping operations was strengthened significantly in 2000 with the establishment of the Police Division within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and again in 2007 with the creation of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions as the overarching and coordinating organization within DPKO to achieve a comprehensive peace operations capacity, including civilian police and other civilian functions. Headed by U.N. Assistant Secretary General Dmitry Titov, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions is specifically charged with coordinating activities in the areas of police, justice, corrections, demining, DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants), and security sector reform in the context of peace operations.

The need for U.N. peacekeeping to address both military peacekeeping functions as well as those security functions best carried out by civilian police is well established, as is the need to coordinate those functions together at the planning and training stages, and to include “downstream” civilian rule of law functions such as prosecutorial, judicial, corrections, and other civilian activities. U.N. missions must have the necessary expertise to address a complex crisis along the peace operations continuum from military peacekeeping to the use of deployed police units, who work alongside host nation police forces, build host nation capacity, and, in some cases, maintain the peace directly. This effort must be linked with related civilian functions, both in the judicial sector, and in other key capacity-building areas.

The History of U.N. Civilian and Police Peacekeeping Capacity

From the 1960s until the early 1990s, U.N. civilian police functions were for the most part limited to monitoring, observing, and reporting. After that, U.N. civilian police took on added roles as advisers, mentors, and trainers of host country police forces, occasionally carrying out joint patrols, and supporting human rights protection and community policing. Over 17,000 civilian police were deployed in U.N. missions in 2010. Formed police units (FPUs) have been fielded by the U.N. since 1999, both to protect U.N. personnel and facilities, and in a limited number of cases to provide crowd control and law enforcement where host country police are not able

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to do so adequately. FPUs have become a key element of many U.N. peace operations missions, and 65 units (with over 7,700 police) were deployed in 2011.2

U.N. police missions have met with varying degrees of success over the years. One of the more successful examples was in Haiti, prior to the 2010 earthquake, in restoring order to the Cité de Soleil neighborhood. This was a geographically and functionally focused effort, but one which was also integrated into the larger U.N. stabilization mission and which partnered with local and Member State capacity. It is one example of what U.N. police capacity can do.

In 2007, a small standing police capacity was established within the U.N., and it now includes about 41 police officers in Brindisi, Italy. The establishment of a standing police capacity has given the international community an organic pre-trained and mission-ready civilian capability to respond to crises. Standing judicial and corrections components were approved in 2010, and six civilian criminal law and judicial advisors have joined their police colleagues in Brindisi. This small standing capacity is clearly only a start. The establishment of a larger, jointly-trained standing capacity, including police, police advisors and mentors, and judicial, corrections and other civilian experts is the next step.

**Gaps Between Expectations and Resources**

As outlined in the U.N.’s “New Horizons” reform process, critical gaps persist between expectations and resources in peacekeeping, especially in the area of civilian protection and other civilian police functions.3 A number of studies point out that the “lack of civilian capacity” necessary to maintain order and rule of law, and for the transition from peacekeeping to peacbuilding, is in fact a paucity of readily available and rapidly deployable expertise in the U.N. system, and not a generalized shortage of international experts willing to do the work.4,5 A standing police and justice sector capacity can help to address some of that gap, by establishing a core group of first responders who are vetted, trained and ready to deploy on a moment’s notice. The inclusion in this group of civilian judicial and corrections experts is important, but the small numbers in the current standing force – of police as well as other civilians – are not adequate

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to address the U.N.’s needs. Increasing an integrated standing civilian capacity for peacekeeping operations is – appropriately – an important and near-term priority for the U.N.

The U.N.’s standing police and rule of law capacity must be enlarged, to give a base capacity for immediate deployment of the right civilian police and rule of law teams to crises. Proponents of stronger U.N. capabilities have called for standing capacity in many areas, including genocide and mass atrocities. Large standing capacities in a wide variety of functions would clearly increase the U.N.’s ability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, but it is probably not sustainable in all cases. Modest standing capacities in areas of proven need, however, are a critical part of a rapid deployment capability. Certainly the recent history of U.N. civilian police deployments supports the need for a standing police capacity, and given the numbers deployed, a standing capacity in excess of 100 police, augmented by associated civilian experts in rule of law, human rights, and conflict mitigation, is reasonable. The Stimson Center makes a logical case for a ten-fold increase of the current standing capacity to give a two-mission capability with requisite training and redeployment time.

However, standing capacity alone will never meet the entire need when a complex crisis arises, and national capacities for police and other civilian rule of law experts must also be strengthened and procedures to recruit and deploy them must be diversified and made more effective. The U.N.’s “CIVCAP” review recognizes that the biggest challenges in meeting growing civilian needs include rapid deployment of civilians at the early stages of a mission. The U.S. State Department’s International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support (IPPOS) program helps train foreign police and foreign formed police units, much as the longer-standing Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program has done for military peacekeepers and military peacekeeping units themselves. The IPPOS program builds capacity among developing states that are ready to contribute to U.N. peace operations but need assistance to do so effectively. Along with a limited number of other programs worldwide, U.S. programs to build capacity for national police contributions to U.N. police missions are an important contribution to the U.N.’s ability to respond to crises. A robust IPPOS program of course does not obviate the need for U.S. contributions (through programs such as the State Department’s Office of International Narcotics and Law (INL) for example) of police, police advisors, and other civilian experts to the U.N.’s civilian police and rule of law capacity – including its standing capacity.

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Recruitment

It takes more than willing and capable Member States to come forward with civilian expertise to adequately augment standing capacity in peacekeeping operations. Relying on the traditional U.N. recruitment system to staff the civilian needs of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions entails far too much lead time. There is widespread interest in the development of a more rapid recruitment system for key civilian experts, creation of a better-coordinated system of pre-approval and pre-training for members of “stand-by” rosters, growth in the size of rosters, and a reversal of the effective ban on provision of “gratis” personnel from Member States. In addition to increasing standing U.N. civilian capacity, and building up national capacities of Member States, all of the above measures should be pursued to address “chronic and systemic shortcomings” and fill the civilian rapid-deployment capabilities gap.9

Gender and geographic balance in deployed civilian capacity is important, and can be supported by member states training and outreach efforts in their countries to ensure a well-trained cadre of diverse and capable civilian personnel serve in U.N. missions. This type of assistance could be extended to other civilian response areas: the judiciary, corrections, human rights protection, and DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants), to ensure a rapidly deployable civilian capacity across all peace operations functions. This could be a function of the soon to be formed Civilian Stabilization Operations Bureau (CSO).

Integrated Planning and Deployment

U.N. reform efforts over the past decade and longer, and analyses of peacekeeping activities in the wake of the Brahimi Report, have emphasized the need for integrated planning, assessments and operations across the full spectrum of peace operations, to include military peacekeepers, police, judicial and corrections functions, and other civilian functions.10 Coupled with the development of a more robust police capacity, including formed police units and a standing capacity, this focus on integrated mission development and execution is a key development in the evolution of the United Nations’ ability to rapidly and effectively address complex crises rooted in interstate conflict, civil war, natural disasters, and the multiple challenges of failed, failing and fragile states.

Effective peace operations require an integrated approach that includes planning, deployment, logistics, operational coordination, and assessments across the full spectrum of functions: maintenance of peace/enforcement

of agreements, maintenance of public order, stabilization efforts, and early recovery and even development programs. Integration of peacekeeping forces, police units, rule of law and other basic security/stabilization-related functions is essential. These efforts must also be linked in the planning, training, and operational phases with other functions in the same space such as humanitarian aid delivery and host nation capacity-building. Capacity-building in key areas of government service delivery – to include policing, prosecutions, the judiciary, tax collection and government administration, special programs for vulnerable populations, conflict mitigation, protection of basic human rights, and short-term, fast-impact job creation – is essential in creating the stability and early recovery necessary for the successful completion for a peacekeeping mission.

Those interested in boosting U.N. peace operations capacity will increasingly be focusing on the further development of the concept of integrated mission operations, training, assessment, and planning, as well as on mechanisms to more rapidly deploy civilians. The integration of planning and assessments with operations and the more rapid deployment of civilians are in fact key elements of the U.N. CIVCAP review’s “OPEN” concept (ownership, partners, expertise, nimble).\footnote{U.N. Office of the Secretary-General, “Civilian Capacity.”} NATO, the European Union, the African Union and a number of national response capacities are basing much of their current efforts on this integrated approach to conflict prevention, and to post-conflict and post-disaster response. The U.N. should take advantage of current Member State and international/multilateral organization efforts to make civilian peacebuilding expertise more nimble and expeditionary and better integrated in wider post-conflict mission planning.

**U.S. Contribution**

The U.S. has an enormous national police capacity and, over time, has developed systems for deploying moderate numbers of federal, state and local authorities overseas. These systems should continue to operate with an eye toward expanding the U.S.’s ability to provide timely expert assistance in areas of the most need and especially in areas where the U.S. may have some comparative advantages, such as intelligence, community liaison, police administration and internal affairs, and -- where appropriate and sustainable -- the employment of advanced technologies. In addition, the U.S. should continue to deploy civilians across the rule of law continuum, to include prosecutors, judges, legal aid, court administration, and corrections. State Department and Justice Department programs that coordinate this capacity should be further organized and resourced to do this in an integrated manner, and in closer cooperation with U.N. efforts. However, the time consuming nature of standard civil service hiring procedures limit what the federal government can do to rapidly support
U.N. missions with civilian expertise.

The U.S. does not have its own national-level “heavy” police capacity (a “gendarmerie”). The creation of such a force for international use is an idea that has been explored at the State and Justice Departments, but that study was never concluded and presented to policy-makers. Given budget constraints and controversies surrounding how such a force might or might not be used domestically, U.S. contributions to U.N. Formed Police Units (FPUs) will probably continue to be in the form of individual experts and training of foreign units.

Other civilian response functions, such as those addressed by the U.S. Civilian Response Corps (CRC), should be seen as an asset for meeting the needs of broader U.N. peacekeeping operations as well. Officially inaugurated in 2008, the CRC concept arose in 2004 as part of an effort to integrate civilian and military planning and operations in drastic failed state scenarios. It was seen in the first instance as a way to give the U.S. a unilateral civilian capability to work alongside the U.S. military to stabilize and rebuild after a conflict, with Iraq and Afghanistan being the most direct models. A partnership among nine U.S. federal agencies, the CRC supports peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and early recovery efforts with small numbers of police, rule of law, diplomatic, essential services, and early recovery development experts. Doctrinally, it places a high value on integrated planning and common training across many civilian functions, as well as rapid call-up and deployment of civilian experts. Poised to be reformulated as part of a new State Department bureau, there are no prohibitions in the U.S. to the CRC offering more direct support to U.N. missions, and thereby becoming a more capable multilateral tool. Likewise, the CRC’s international networking efforts (the International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative) could assist the U.N. in its standby capabilities.
Recommendations

This Report recommends that the United States:

4.1 Support an increase of the U.N. standing police capacity. While it is not economical or even feasible to maintain a standing force capable of meeting all needs, a short-term aim should be to double the size of the existing force of police and to at least triple the number of rule of law experts. The numbers recommended by the Stimson Report (400, with one-third non-police civilians) is not unreasonable though may be too ambitious as an immediate goal.

4.2 Work with the U.N. Secretariat and key Member States to diversify hiring mechanisms and create new recruitment procedures for civilian positions to allow for rapid mission-specific hires in areas of special need in police, judicial and other civilian functions. These procedures should support the goals of the “OPEN” concept. They should increase the flexibility and speed of civilian recruitment and deployment efforts, and utilize pre-approved and pre-trained rosters and systems that Member States are developing. U.N. limits on gratis contributions should be automatically lifted in initial stages of missions.

4.3 Increase U.S. support for national law enforcement capacities of other nations to contribute to U.N. police missions, focusing on countries of the global south. GPOI and IPPOS should receive increased funding, as should the Civilian Response Corps -- especially its efforts to partner with the U.N. and other multilateral and international organizations. Measured increases in these modest programs are cost effective, when compared to the cost of military missions.

4.4 More robustly support U.N. police mission logistics in areas of critical need, including airlift, specialized equipment, and intelligence. Repayment requirements in law can and should be waived to support effective, cost saving multilateral peace operations. Funding for this should be added to the State Department’s appropriation and should not rely exclusively on DOD transfers.

4.5 Continue and grow U.S. funding for U.N. police and related international civilian peace operations, allowing USAID, the State Department (the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)), and the Department of Justice (International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT)) programs to grow as needed, especially in the areas of integrating assistance across security, rule of law, and other civilian functions.
Summary of Recommendations
U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

1.1 Each new Fiscal Year, Congress appropriates enough money for the United States to fully pay its current peacekeeping assessments.

1.2 Congress permanently repeals the 25% cap on U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

1.3 The United States uses its voice and vote at the U.N. to increase reimbursement rates for TCCs and index these payments to inflation.

1.4 The United States uses its voice and vote at the U.N. to push forward on peacekeeping reforms particularly related to the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS).

Women in International Peacekeeping

2.1 The U.N. continues to set targets, calling on Member States to contribute to DPKO women peacekeepers with specific, tangible skills, replicating programs such as the SG Global Initiative.

2.2 DOD conducts an internal evaluation of its personnel for their increased deployment of women to multilateral operations.

2.3 DOD includes preferences for women within job descriptions for staff officers.

2.4 DOD creates incentives for U.S. women to serve the U.N.

2.5 DOD continues to support, participate in and fund roster programs and training to build the pool of qualified women personnel.

2.6 The United States engages military academies, graduate and leadership programs and training institutions to broaden the pool of female talent (including West Point, the National Defense University, and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operational Institute).
2.7 Partnering with other PCCs and TCCs to aid information and knowledge sharing.

2.8 Once adopted, the National Action Plan (NAP) should receive support and full funding by Congress.

Training and Equipping Peacekeepers

3.1 Reinvigorate the Presidential Peacekeeping Initiative.

3.2 Deploy a military contingent or pledge “over-the-horizon” military support to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, preferably in Africa.

3.3 Set rising numerical targets for placing relevant U.S. personnel in U.N. mission staffs.

3.4 Support the certification and operationalization of U.N. training standards.

3.5 Work with key partner countries to support priority training initiatives within the U.N. Secretariat.

3.6 Strengthen the operational and tactical dimensions of peacekeeping operations in Africa by increasing funding to the ACOTA program.

3.7 Share intelligence with U.N. peacekeeping operations.

3.8 Donate relevant equipment to help fill capability gaps identified in the U.N. “gaps lists.”

3.9 Empower the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to increase its collaboration with international training centers.
Standing Civilian and Police Capacity

| 4.1 | Support an increase of the U.N. standing police capacity. |
| 4.2 | Work with the U.N. Secretariat and key Member States to diversify hiring mechanisms and create new recruitment procedures for civilian positions to allow for rapid mission-specific hires in areas of special need in police, judicial and other civilian functions. |
| 4.3 | Increase U.S. support for national law enforcement capacities of other nations to contribute to U.N. police missions, focusing on countries of the global south. |
| 4.4 | More robustly support U.N. police mission logistics in areas of critical need, including airlift, specialized equipment, and intelligence. |
| 4.5 | Continue and grow U.S. funding for U.N. police and related international civilian peace operations. |
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**Kristen A. Cordell** has served the United Nations in missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Lebanon. Within these contexts she has advised on issues related to sexual and gender based violence, security sector reform, policy interventions for improved national capacities and empowerment strategies for women in post conflict contexts. She has authored several books and reports on the role of women and gender in post conflict reconstruction including: *Women and Nation Building* (RAND, 2007) and *Best Practices in Gender and Peacekeeping* (UN-DPKO, 2010). She has also worked on Gender Evaluation for the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group. Ms. Cordell was heavily involved in the advocacy and passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1820, “Against the Use of Rape as a Tool of War,” now being implemented across member states. From 2009 to 2010 she served as the Senior Gender Advisor for the Lebanon Field Office of UNRWA. Ms. Cordell holds a bachelor’s degree in History and Political Science and a master’s degree in Public Policy from Pepperdine University. In 2011 she was named as one of the Top 99 under 33 Foreign Policy Leaders, by YPFP. She currently supports Refugees International work on Gender and Peacekeeping in the Middle East and Africa.

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Paul D. Williams is associate professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. He is also associate director of the Elliott School’s Security Policy Studies M.A. program. He taught previously in the U.K. at the University of Warwick, the University of Birmingham, and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. He has been a visiting scholar at Georgetown University and the University of Queensland and a visiting professor at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. His research interests lie primarily in the politics of contemporary peace operations, civilian protection policies and Africa’s international relations. Among his books are Understanding Peacekeeping (2010, 2nd edition); War and Conflict in Africa (2011); Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa (2010); The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur (2010); and Peace Operations and Global Order (2005).
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICAP</td>
<td>Africa Peacekeeping Program, U.S. Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDT</td>
<td>Conduct and Disciplinary Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Contributions to International Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIPA</td>
<td>Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCAP</td>
<td>Civilian Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Contingent-Owned Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civilian Stabilization Operations Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-34</td>
<td>U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Recommendations</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support, United Nations</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GenCAP</td>
<td>Gender Standby Capacity</td>
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<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy</td>
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<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAPTC</td>
<td>International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>International Narcotics and Law, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPPOS</td>
<td>International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEN</td>
<td>Ownership, Partners, Expertise, Nimble (concept of UN CIVCAP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKSOI</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative to the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSAFE</td>
<td>Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWEDINT</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces International Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNACTION</td>
<td>United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USUN</td>
<td>United States Mission to the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCPU</td>
<td>Women and Children Protection Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEOG</td>
<td>Western European and Others Group</td>
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In 2009, the Obama Administration signaled that the United States would increase its participation in international peacekeeping missions and identified key goals to accomplish this mission. The Report examines what has been accomplished and identifies challenges that have hindered increased engagement in international peacekeeping operations. The Report offers recommendations for how the Administration and Congress can improve engagement in international peacekeeping in four key areas:

- U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping
- Women in Peacekeeping
- Training and Equipping Peacekeepers
- Standing Civilian and Police Capacity

www.effectivepeacekeeping.org